Lawsuit Alleges That WhatsApp Has No End-to-End Encryption
As evidence, the lawsuit cites unnamed "courageous whistleblowers" who allege that WhatsApp and Meta employees can request to view a user's messages through a simple process, thus bypassing the app's end-to-end encryption. "A worker need only send a 'task' (i.e., request via Meta's internal system) to a Meta engineer with an explanation that they need access to WhatsApp messages for their job," the lawsuit claims. "The Meta engineering team will then grant access -- often without any scrutiny at all -- and the worker's workstation will then have a new window or widget available that can pull up any WhatsApp user's messages based on the user's User ID number, which is unique to a user but identical across all Meta products."
"Once the Meta worker has this access, they can read users' messages by opening the widget; no separate decryption step is required," the 51-page complaint adds. "The WhatsApp messages appear in widgets commingled with widgets containing messages from unencrypted sources. Messages appear almost as soon as they are communicated -- essentially, in real-time. Moreover, access is unlimited in temporal scope, with Meta workers able to access messages from the time users first activated their accounts, including those messages users believe they have deleted." The lawsuit does not provide any technical details to back up the rather sensational claims.
https://it.slashdot.org/story/26/01/27/0550249/lawsuit-alleges-that-whatsapp-has-no-end-to-end-encryptionOpen linkView original on lemmy.dbzer0.com
DUH
No if this is proven it would be a real scandal and would bring a lot of users to better alternatives.
If it's false that's good too, since then WA has e2e encryption
Most users of whatsapp don't care about e2e. They hardly even know what it is.
Right. This place sometimes forget that we are tiny community of techies that hate the system. Makes me see this place as a bit of a circlejerk at times.
Yeah the venn diagram overlap of “people who understand and care about e2ee enough to drop a messaging app for not supporting it” and “people who use whatsapp” has to be a sliver
It must really be empty... Two contradictory assumptions lol
Not empty... It's hard to embark all your family, relatives and friends on your journey to fucking basic privacy principles
No but average people understand the concept of meta reading and accessing your private message. That would be a scandal and righly so
They don't but they do know what "Any Meta employee, and every US government employees, can read all of your messages" means
Especially if they saw it now
They don't know what e2e encryption is, but they sure as hell know what "employees have access to all your messages" means. Sure, it makes it harder for them to find a good alternative, but it will scare some away from Meta (unknown how many will actually care).
"Your messages are public and being read by silicon valley creeps"
That's easy enough to understand.
True. But some would care about broken promises
It's already a known risk, because WA uses centralized key management and servers, and always has regardless what Meta says. If you believe their bullshit, then I feel sad for you.
Also...you don't think that LAWYERS willing to go up against Meta would have rock solid proof from these whistleblowers FIRST before filing a lawsuit?
C'mon now, buddy.
I'm surprised anyone is surprised. It's been known since WhatsApp came out that it's not true e2ee because meta holds your keys.
Well they did this whole stupid "rebranding" of it becoming e2e after Facebook bought them a few years back, but literally every security researchers was like "Nahhhh, pass".
considering that you can decrypt facebook e2e encryption with a 6 digit security pin... yea Facebook at least has the private keys backed up server side.
I don't use any Meta products, so not sure how you mean. If you are a user that has been sending e2e messages, then you can surely decrypt said messages if you're a participant in those messages transactions.
So, with facebook if you lose your device, you can register a new device to the account and recover your messages using a 6 digit security pin or a recovery code.
This means that your messages are stored in decryptable format either via a private key being stored, or as a separate server encrypted form in a backup.
I just had to go through this with my grandfather a few months back.
This is not how civil court works. It's not trial by combat. There is no standard for the quality of lawsuits filed. And despite what the ambulance chasers say on TV, Layers get paid even when they loose.
"alleged in a lawsuit..." is the same level of credibility as "they out here saying...".
It doesn't matter if it's criminal or civil. The costs to bring such a case are massive, and you're leaving yourself open to a behemoth like Meta just dragging out the case for lengthy periods of time which drastically increase those costs.
No law firm files suit against a giant company like this unless they have rock solid proof they will, at the very least, land a settlement plus recuperation of costs. Just not a thing.
What do you want from me here?
Mark zuckerberg eats scandals for breakfast
Yes but Whatsapp has been pretty reliable and trustworthy for many people. No ads etc
we can't lose!
People wouldnt move. They know its not secure and they dont care enough.
How would we know?
It would not. People don't care. People don't care that meta is an evil corp. Encryption is not even close to the top 10 reasons people use that app. It's just a random word normal users throw around because marketing told them it's good.
Normal users don't talk about encryption at all but they somewhat trust WhatsApp
What are the better alternatives? because it seems like the comment section is flooded with people (yourself included) that don't understand that most (probably all) e2e messaging apps are vulnerable to this attack as long as they trust a centralized server.
The issue isn't an encryption one, it's a trust one that requires you to trust the makers of the messaging app and the servers the apps connect to (and the method by which the app is distributed to you).
Signal uses reproducible builds for its Android client, and I think for desktop as well. That means it's possible to verify that a particular Signal package is built from the open source Signal codebase. I don't have to trust Signal because I can check or build it myself.
If I don't have extreme security needs, I don't even have to check. Signal has a high enough profile that I can be confident other people have checked, likely many other people who are more skilled at auditing cryptographic code than I am.
Trusting the server isn't necessary because the encryption is applied by the sender's client and removed by the recipient's client.
Maybe but that doesn't mean you have the same app they do, Google may have different apks for people who could check it and for those who won't.
There is a risk Google could tamper with the app for specific users if they're installing it from Google Play. I think it's likely security researchers would discover that if it was widespread, but there's a chance Google could do it undetected if they targeted it selectively enough.
People who are concerned about this can download the APK directly from Signal and check its signature before installation.
Signal
You're just replacing trust in Meta with trust in Signal Inc without understanding why WhatsApp is vulnerable to this.
Is Signal Inc more trustworthy than Meta? probably
is Signal (app) safe from the attack described? absolutely not.
Theoretically, you can check the code actually running on the Signal servers is the code they publish under a free and open source licence, using the hardware-based TEE attestations the servers will return
Someone more knowledgeable than me may have managed to do so, I haven't.
Tell me you don't understand how Signal's E2E mechanism works without telling me you don't understand how Signal's E2E mechanism works.
Tell me you don't understand what E2E encryption is without telling me you don't understand that the limits of E2E encryption.
See every other comment in this thread describing in great detail why you are wrong, but that you fundamentally DO NOT UNDERSTAND how any of this works whatsoever.
You fundamentally DO NOT UNDERSTAND how security works, go play with your algorithms and stop spamming my replies.
Um, security is based largely on encryption algorithms.
This is key and I don't think Signal shies away from this. You MUST trust the code you're running. We know there are unofficial Signal builds. You must trust them. Why? Because think of it this way. You're running a build of Signal, you type a messages. In code that text you type then gets run through Signal's encryption. If you're running a non-trustworthy build, they have access to the clear text before encryption, obviously. They can encrypt it twice, once with their key and once with yours, send it to a server, decrypt theirs and send yours on to it's destination. (for example, there's more ways than this).
The code can be okay but it's delivery method(aka Google), the OS(aka Google) or the hardware can be compromised.
Just because it's centralized doesn't mean that it falls under this risk sector. Theoretically if the app was open sourced and was confirmed to not share your private key remotely on generation (or cross sign the key to allow a master key...), then the most the centralized server could know is your public key, the server wouldn't have the ability to obtain the private key (which is what is needed to read the e2e encrypted messages)
This process would be repeated for the other party. The cool part of that system is you can still share your public keys via the centralized server, so you wouldn't need to share the key externally. You just need to be able to confirm that the app itself doesn't contain code to send your private key to the centralized server. Then checking integrity is as easy as messaging your friend to post what their public key is, and that public key would need to match the public key that the server is supplying as your contact.
The server can't MiTM attack it because the server has no way of deciphering the message in the first place, so the most it could do is pass the message onto the proper party whom has the private key to be able to decrypt it.
Not that I have any other suggestions aside from signal though, there aren't many centralized e2e chat services. Most use client to server encryption which would allow decryption server side.
The attack as described almost certainly involves the server sending a message to your client and then having the messages replicated via a side channel to Whatsapp without breaking E2E encryption (it could be adding them as a desktop client or adding them as a hidden participant in all chats, that isn't clear in the article)
If you could run Whatsapp without connecting to Meta, you would be safe from this attack, but as you’ve pointed out a secure client is a better solution.
Fully agree that in this case if the claim is true (they have had a few of these claims), it's likely whatsapp either making itself a companion app that's hidden, or has some form of escrow in place to allow deciphering the messages. (Considering Messenger allows decrypting e2e chats with a 6 digit security pin, I'm leaning towards an escrow)
I was just mentioning that this isn't a fault of it being centralized, this is a design choice by the company when implementing e2e encryption, and that a properly functioning system would never give the server the ability to decipher the messages in the first place.
Element / matrix.
With e2e you don't need to trust the servers. You only need to trust the client that does the encryption.
Should you not also trust your device hardware, it's os and the market you got the app from?
That's a given I think. If you can't trust the OS then you can't trust the client.
The attack as described almost certainly involves the server sending a message to your client and then having the messages replicated via a side channel to Whatsapp without breaking E2E encryption.
But yes the point is you can't trust the clients.
If you could run Whatsapp without connecting to Meta, you would be safe from this attack, but as you've pointed out a secure client is a better solution.
What is your alternative? Everybody codes their own app??
Also you're unhinged in these comments
People should understand the limits of E2E encryption.
I'd rather be unhinged than wrong.
Shocked, I tell you
That's just another comment
Well if I can't trust Meta with my information, who CAN I trust
Me
Oh okay. My location is 55.752121, 37.617664, my full name is Jeremy, and my password is hunter9. I trust you not to tell this to anybody
Your full name is "Jeremy"?
Oh god damnit chemicalprofet why did you tell this guy i thougjt i could trust you :((
All I see is '••••••'
I see '******' though.
Maybe it's just a different interface.
Jeremy "Iks" Hunter IX
Edit: IX. Iks. I think we got it right now.
The Ninth
Pronounced "iks"
Just like Cher (which is short for Cheremy).
Your secret is safe with us and our 36,893 affiliates.
Legitimate interest, though 🤞
Nice to see the ancient lore alive.
Hi Vova
Can confirm, chemicalprophet is the best password manager I've ever used.
Ah! You did your own research!
ta
The drunk dude that's always sitting on the ground near the park entrance and sell weird tissue dolls with curly hairs is more trustworthy, I'd say.
The biggest news is that Slashdot is still alive.
+5 insightful
I used to find slashdot delightful,
but my feelings of late are more spiteful;
my comments sarcastic
the iconoclastic
keep modding to plus five (Insightful).
Assume the same for Telegram and pretty much any chat platform that controls your private keys.
Telegram doesnt even pretend to be end to end encrypted.
Telegram for iOS lets you create “secret chats” but as far as I know other platforms have eliminated that functionality at the request of governments. And I would assume Apple technically controls the keys on device.
How? Not natively unless I’m mistaken
Not natively that I know of, but Telegram for iOS has the option when looking at someone’s profile. However, the Windows client does not.
Ah I see your edit now, thanks (and see how it was assumed implied :) )
The telegram was clear as a day they announced cooperation with the Russian government and they unblocked it. That was way before the whole France fiasco, I doubt they're actually giving up the keys to France. I'm from East and many say that Telegram now is essentially a Russian weapon. Surveillance at home, total free reign (sell drugs, spread CP, etc.) in west.
If you're American, I believe Telegram is actually safer than Whatsapp, as long as you can ignore the dirty side of it (surface deep web?), hence why Europe wants it under control
Wait, you are telling me that the company whos entire business is collecting personal information, including people who don't sign up for their services, to leverage for advertising, is keeping their platforms unsecured they can continually grab more information rather than secure it?
I for one am shocked, absolutely shocked.
Yes, except they’re not leveraging your data for advertising, they’re leveraging it so they can manipulate your political views and keep you from finding solidarity with other working people.
@FlyingCircus @technology These two things are the same thing
It is end to end encrypted but they can just pull the decrypted message from the app. This has been assumed for years, since they said they could parse messages for advertising purposes.
it’s not even that: they just hold the keys so can simply decrypt your messages with out your clients intervention any time they like
Yep, If they can access messages that are deleted from your device, then they have the keys.
Hasn't it always been that they can decrypt the backups that you personally setup in wa, this way they don't legally lie to you when the app tells you "this chat is encrypted, even Whatsapp cannot read the messages".
Yes, any time you can store and recover encrypted cloud archives across devices, without needing to transfer keys between devices, it implies that there is a key archive somewhere in the cloud. Even Signal struggles to get this both user friendly and properly secure without compromising forward secrecy. I believe they still actually make you explicitly do a local key transfer to populate a new device, even though they have cloud archives now. Whatsapp doesn't do that. And the app also clearly leaks some amount of unencrypted data anyway, archives or not.
Surely they have access otherwise how do they moderate and investigate account blocks, reports of spam etc. Accounts get suspended, then some automation reviews it, then it escalates to a human, who will have to make a judgement based on some policy. How can they do that if they see nothing? (I'm asking not condoning).
15 years ago I’d have called this a conspiracy theory given how the evidence seems to be anecdotal, but given literally every single other thing we’ve learned in recent times about how cartoonishly evil and lying the tech bros truly are, it seems entirely likely.
s/the tech bros/humans/
Despite "the tech bros" really being that, I'm learning over time about some people surprisingly cowardly and evil, while looking like better versions of me, and some other people looking pretty normal and usual, while being epic and tragic heroes, and some other people looking like a typical Nazi 80 years late to the party, yet more honorable than many, and some other people looking like weak and nice versions of me, while having real warrior spirit.
You have no idea how big the world is in all dimensions. We are all looking at it via our daily interactions, via news and internet discussions, via games and via books, and we don't see what's deep inside. Well, I suppose, people who read classics can see something.
And they, these people on top of big tech, being just human, have such powers. What can they do with them? Perhaps we should forgive them for not being wise in deciding to have those powers, and praise them for doing less evil with them than they could.
So. Perhaps in 15 years you've just grown.
If I am not adding my own private key to the app, like in Tox, I don't trust their encryption.
Tox also isn't that great security wise. It's hard to beat Signal when it comes to security messengers. And Signal is open source so, if it did anything weird with private keys, everyone would know
Well, no. At least not by default as you are running a compiled version of it. Someone could inject code you don't know anything about before compilation that for example leaked your keys.
One way to be more confident no one has, would be to have predictable builds that you can recreate and then compare the file fingerprints. But I do not think that is possible, at least on android, as google holds they signature keys to apps.
Signal has reproducible builds and here's the instruction how to check it on Android https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/blob/main/reproducible-builds/README.md
If they have, then good. Wasn't sure it was doable with current google's signing process. Highly unlikely someone hasn't tampered with them then (far easier to target the site displaying the "correct" fingerprint).
However, my original point still stands. Just because it is open source doesn't in itself mean that a bad actor can't tamper with it.
Signal is also on F-Droid, so it should be verifiable
Being prebuilt isn't the same as open source! By that metric Linux is closed source because 99.9% of Linux users don't build their own kernels (and those that do ought to shower anyway).
Well, Whatsapp uses signal. Bad timing
How?
Unless proof is given, assume troll
Read the article? An app using signal does not imply that your data is still encrypted from corporations or government. Your neighbour joe is not very likely to break already established SSL, so using signal feels like someone is trying to sell me a bridge. Sense of false security. In fact, that was probably their goal all along.
WhatsApp is using Signals protocol for communication: https://signal.org/blog/whatsapp-complete/
I don't fully understand what it entails, but from what I understand is that yes, WhatsApp is using the same encryption and message flow that signal uses, but you're still using Meta's app, and they can just read the plaintext message from there.
To my knowledge, under Signal, the encription keys are locally generated and stored, and the traffic flows between end points as a closed packet.
This does not seem to be the case here, as the keys are generated and stored outside your equipment and, thus, are viable to be used by a third party to access packets.
But I admit I speak heavily burdened by technical ignorance.
My understanding is they're sending a request to your device that then decrypts and uploads messages, not storing the keys outside your device.
that’s incorrect. with whatsapp, your keys are stored on meta servers (the same as things like imessage). they can simply decrypt them whenever they like, just like being signed in as you. it’s completely invisible to your client
Or they can make a copy of the encryption keys on creation. Using the code is very different than using the code unedited, or using all the code.
Read more than just the title ffs
I did and nowhere is Signal mentioned in the article.
You state Whatsapp uses Signal. So, again: how?
The article does not describe what encryption it uses, it described how they're abusing it. Whatsapp using Signal protocol is public knowledge.
What I'm trying to say is that a company using signal for it's messaging app does not imply your data is safe from that company or governments.
You recommending an app purely because of Signal protocol under an article about how an app abuses signal protocol is pretty fucking ironic (aka. bad timing)
EDIT: Alright TikTokkers, I looked up the source on Google so that you don't have to spend 30 seconds: https://signal.org/blog/whatsapp-complete/
You can stop downvotting me now.
Yes we know that it used the Signal protocol in 2016 but there is no doubt it drifted a lot since. A lot of changes were made to Signal since and we don't know how WhatsApp protocol evolved. You can't assume they're still equivalent now. And one is open source with reproducible builds while the other is not.
It only uses some of signal's code. Not necessarily the OOTB key storage and security.
What's stopping the app from keeping your private key and still not encrypting anything?
I'm not trying to be difficult here, I just don't see how anything outside of an application whose source you can check yourself can be trusted.
All applications hosted by other people require you to react positively to "just trust me bro".
Or, if the app has the private key for decryption for the user to be able to see the messages, what's stopping the app from copying that decrypted text somewhere else?
The thread model isn't usually key management, it's more about the insecure treatment of the decrypted message after decryption.
What's to stop an evil company uploading the keys as soon as you enter them in the App? It certainly wouldn't stop Meta.
Man, you just brought back memories. I forgot qtox was even a thing. I think I still have my profile saved in my dev folder somewhere for my account
WhatsApp client is closed source. Any claims around E2EE is pointless, since it's impossible to verify.
It's E2EE alright. Just, don't ask what "ends" we're talking about.
Their mouth and Zuckerberg's ass
For Facebook it doesn't matter if its e2e. They control the client on both sides. They can just let the client sent the clear text data to them.
TMBE
Trust me bro encryption
This is objectively false. Reverse engineering is a thing, as is packet inspection.
Reverse engineering is theoretically possible, but often very difficult in practice.
I'm not enough of an expert in cryptography to know for sure if packet inspection would allow you to tell if a ciphertext could be decrypted by a second "back door" key. My gut says it's not possible, but I'd be happy to be proven wrong.
Hell, as far as I know, E2EE would be indistinguishable from client to server encryption, where the server can read everything without the need for a secret "backdoor key". You can see that the channel is encrypted, but you can't know who has the other key.
The easiest way to break E2EE is to copy your private key to Meta's servers. It's very easy to implement, and close to impossible to detect.
Now you just need Meta to allow you on their networks to inspect packets and reverse engineer their servers because as far as I know, WhatsApp messages are not P2P.
/edit I betcha $5 that the connection from client to server is TLS(https), good luck decrypting that to see what its payload is.
No it is not. Whatsapp gets several updates a month. How do you keep up with that rate?
Outside of open-source. That shit is usually illegal
It isn't. Otherwise security research would never happen for proprietary software and services.
SureSure no white hat never been sued before
In the US, CFAA is so draconian that in certain aspects it can be very illegal to reverse engineer code behind explicit ToS which whatsapp make you agree through click-wrap agreement (meaning explicit I agree button press) upon installing the app. So Meta could easily sue you with very good chance of winning. I work in security and reverse engineer a lot of stuff but just because my company has lawyers that will protect me (also I'm not an american) but generally americans are super fucked here and there are many stories of people being sued and even imprisoned for breaking ToS.
E2EE isn't really relevant, when the "ends" have the functionality, to share data with Meta directly: as "reports", "customer support", "assistance" (Meta AI); where a UI element is the separation.
Edit: it turns out cloud backups aren't E2E encrypted by default... meaning: any backup data, which passes through Meta's servers, to the cloud providers (like iCloud or Google Account), is unobscured to Meta; unless E2EE is explicitly enabled. And even then, WhatsApp's privacy policy states: "if you use a data backup service integrated with our Services (like iCloud or Google Account), they will receive information you share with them, such as your WhatsApp messages." So the encryption happens on the server side, meaning: Apple and Google still have full access to the content. It doesn't matter if you, personally, refuse to use the "feature": if the other end does, your interactions will be included in their backups.
Yeah. E2EE isn’t a single open standard. It’s a general security concept / practice. There’s no way to argue that they don’t really have E2EE if in fact they do, but they keep a copy of the encryption key for themselves. Also, the workers client app can simply have the “decrypt step” done transparently. Or, a decrypted copy of the messages could be stored in a cache that the client app uses… who knows? E2EE being present or not isn’t really the main story here. It’s Meta’s obvious deceitful-ness by leveraging the implicit beliefs about E2EE held by us common folk.
I don't think it can be called End to End Encryption if it is actually End to End and The guy in the Middle.
Every technical definition of End to End Encryption states only the Sender and Recipient have keys to decrypt the message.
Anything else is using "End to End Encryption" purely as a marketing term like "Lite" or "Pure".
It’s not End to End and The guy in the Middle. The message is encrypted from one end to the other. The detail about who has a copy of the key doesn’t spoil that fact, and I guarantee you Meta doesn’t care about using E2EE as a marketing term even if it misrepresents their actual product by matter of status quo. What matters is what they can theoretically argue in a court room.
A proper solution would be to have an open standard that specially calls out these details, along with certifications issued by trusted third parties.
Yeah, I guess if you want users to keep sharing "confessions, [] difficult debates, or silly inside jokes" through a platform you've acquired, E2EE might give the WhatsApp user the false sense of privacy required.
So, is it basically treating every message as a "group" message where it sends it to some system WhatsApp account and then also to your intended receiver? This is what I'm assuming based on them supposedly being able to see deleted messages. Also would let them say it's technically still "E2EE" since it's indeed E2EE to your receiver, but it's also E2EE to them as well.
Ah yes, good old E2E AWA3E.
"End to end, and we are also an end".
The E is for "Everyone"
The S is for Security.
I guessed you meant "end to end, as well as 3rd end" before reading on.
If that is the case though, its not E2E it's client server encryption and then server client encryption back. thats just deceptive marketing at that point.
Obviously it's deceptive. But if you individually encrypt the messages you're sending, the one you send to the receiver still can't be decrypted by Meta, only the copy sent directly to Meta can, so the copy sent to your intended receiver is still "E2EE."
I don't agree that would fit the protocol of end to end, that's a common misconception, E2E by design means that it's encrypted from the sender to the intended recipient. When you send a message the intended recipient isn't the server, it's the user you are sending to. That type of system would be called an encrypt in transit or a server client encryption not E2E. If they are classifying it as E2E that would be incorrect.
A classic example of a server client or encrypt in transit would be HTTPS, the server acts as a middleman between the clients, meaning that it decrypts the message then re-encrypts the message to the designated choice.
With an e2e system, the message the server transmits is never decrypted, the server already knows the destination based off the public key
An e2ee group chat would need every member to have every other member's public key. So for 5 people, your client would sign with your private key and send 4 unique messages encrypted each with 1 other person's public key. Each of them would decrypt their copy of the message with their private key and verify the signature with your public key. So I think what arcterus was saying was that employee who requests access to a user's messages then becomes just another member of a group chat, but the UI just doesn't show it as such. Every message you send is then secretly encrypted, on your client, with their special public key and sent to them to be decrypted. That would still be E2EE.
ok yea, I do agree with that POV on it. A ghost key like that would be within spec, cause yea at that point it would just be another member. I wasn't taking it as an additional group member though, since the whistleblower is stating that they can put in any user id and have access to all messages live, that would mean they would have a ghost user on all messages period regardless of if its a group chat or not.
That wouldn't be implausible though.
I will say, not too long ago there was some question if I had setup a WhatsApp account with my number due to some emails I was receiving. Not wanting to install the app and unwittingly create an account just by checking if I had one, my wife created a group chat with just her and my number, sent a message, and then we saw it get marked as read by all. Which in an E2EE system should not have been possible without me having the app setup. so I did go ahead and wiped an old and setup the app to make sure I was in control of any account for my number, and I did then receive that group chat. But still, very sketchy.
Except it is still encrypted to the intended recipient. As the other commenter said, WhatsApp is just another "member" of the group that you can't see. Basically all they'd have to do is have a server somewhere functioning as a WhatsApp client. Your client sends the message to your intended recipient. It also then sends the message to their "client." The routing server for the messages can't decrypt the messages. All the messages are still encrypted per-member of the group and can't be decrypted until it hits the ends, but WhatsApp is basically a mole siphoning all your messages and storing them.
I used to store GPG encrypted files in google drive. But then I noticed bitrot in the stored files which made them impossible to decrypt. So I started adding CRC redundancy through DVDisaster. Which worked but became a PITA. So I finally gave up.
They really want your data.
simpler than that in most likelihood… meta is the key holder so login and password recovery is simpler (or at least that’s the excuse they give): you login, they send you your key, which they can also access (and decrypt your messages) whenever they like
Call me old fashioned but I really think that for real E2EE the vendor of the encryption and the vendor of the infrastructure should be two different entities.
For example PGP/GPG on … great! Proton? Not great
Jabber/XMMP with e2ee encryption great! WhatsApp/Telegram/signal… less so (sure I take signal over the other two every day… but it’s enough to compromise a single entity for accessing the data)
Okay Old Fashioned, but doesn't open source encryption audited by a third party solve this problem? Signal protocol for example? Also proton, I'm guessing, but I'm too lazy to check
By this logic, can we trust any open source software, even if they claim to use some third party encryption? They could say they're using a super secure encryption, even show it implemented in their open source code base, then just put the other, secret evil backdoor code base in production? Is there a way for any open source project to prove that the code in their open source repo is the code in production?
But only if you self-host right? Otherwise who ever hosts the matrix instance can tinker with it.
In the end i have to choose between some shady company or some guy with a homelab. I guess I'll choose the one who isn't financially incentivized to screw me over.
This is called reproducible builds. With this all builds of a version will be binary-identical. So you can build from the repo and the compare it with the appstore binary and see if the owner was honest.
I found this:
https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Desktop/blob/main/reproducible-builds/README.md
Looks like they're working on reproducibility, at least in the desktop app. That's a little disappointing but i guess I'm happy they're working on it.
Neat! And can this been done with signal or proton?
Signal: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/blob/main/reproducible-builds/README.md
Proton: didn't find anything (but I just did a quick lookup)
Yep
Unfortunately even the best intentioned and best audited project can be compromised. So that is not a guarantee (sure, much better than closed source but that is a given)
You may be forced by a rubber hose attack (or legal one) to insert vulnerabilities in your code… and you have the traffic… a single point to attack… signal/proton/etc
Is it possible with two different vendors? Sure it is but it is way more complicated
That's a really good point. All we'd need is for signal devs to be compromised in some way and the next update ends security for signal.
why
Not much people use clients anymore.
Yeah and I think it’s a pity. It’s the byproduct of “app culture” everything has to be easy. One button, plug and play…
Unfortunately like many things in life “saving” (time and effort n this case) has a cost
No surprised at all tbf.
Proposed line of defense: "With all respect, M. Judge, with all the different times we fucked our users, lied to them, tricked them, experimented on them, ignored them, we already sold private discussions on Facebook in the past, our CEO and founder most famous quote is «They trust me, dumbfucks!», the list goes on and on: no one in their sane mind would genuinely believe we were not spying on Whatsapp! They try to play dumb, they could not possibly believe we were being fair and honest THIS time?!"
A lot of victim blaming in this thread. Why can't you just be mad for someone who was deceived?
Because it's the gazillionth time the exactly totally absolutely same kind of shit happens with the very exactly same company that didn't even try to hide who they were.
And next week the very very same deceived people will be of Facebook, Instagram, etc. And maybe, just MAYBE they'll migrate away from Whatsapp… to join another proprietary network of another billonaire's controlled megacorp.
Because I'm tired of being "that pain in the ass" when barely suggesting to use something else all to see at the end people crying over things they've be warned about.
If a kid burns themself once on a kitchen's hotplate, you assume they learnt their lesson in an unfortunate way despite all the warnings.
If adults keep burning themselves over and over… and over and over and over, at which point are you entitled to say they're part of the f*cking problem??
I’m sick of Mark fucking zuckerberg.
If i was the mad king of the usa all of those tech bros would be in a jail in el salvador.
OH JUST USE SOMETHING ELSE!
I do but that doesn’t stop that ugly weak fuck from stealing from my business every chance he fucking gets.
It's like buying a hot dog from a gas station and not feeling awesome tomorrow.
If you keep buying the hot dog every week, you see other people buying it and are fine, but you're the only one getting sick week after week, at some point maybe you should just stop buying the hot dog.
No one else is getting sick. They know what they're getting. But you keep buying it expecting this time it'll be different. And when it isn't it's the gas stations fault.
at what point is it someone's responsibility to simply know better?
this isn't some complicated deceit it's literally one of the most untrustworthy companies in the world lying to your face. A company we've known for now like two decades is untrustworthy and overtly harms people to make money
do people have responsibility at all?
People can't take increase responsibility for every single aspect of life. It seems straightforward to you because you're likely tech literate. Do you know every process around how the mechanic services your vehicle, how medicines are made that you consume, how food is curated that you consume, how energy is generated that you consume? People can't have intimate knowledge of every aspect of life, therefore if a company says "this is E2EE" you should be able to believe that at face value and rely on consumer protection agencies to follow up if it's inaccurate.
You don't need to be tech literate to follow the news. Meta has been caught in lie after lie for YEARS and it has all been widely reported on. Meta needs to face actual repercussions for their crimes against humanity, but anybody still buying into their bullshit is being willfully ignorant.
You are correct and incorrect at the same time. Yes, nobody should trust Meta. But Meta should also be dragged into every court available for their lies.
You just agreed with my points while telling me I'm incorrect. How am I incorrect?
No that’s not correct at all. If a company says something you do not in fact just get to believe it at face value and do 0 research, this applies in every field you mentioned. What planet are you from where you are supposed to just believe what companies say at face value????
People often get second options from different mechanics, doctors, contractors, and all sorts of specialists when told something because you need to do your own research to know about stuff.
You literally do in fact need to try and learn and make informed decisions about everything in life.
Chief, if you needed to make an informed decision about every decision in life, there'd be no time for life. That's why other people specialize in jobs so that within reason, confidence can be placed to their decision. I'm not saying you blindly agree and follow everything, but people can't be responsible for every decision. For example, who made the seatbelt in your car? What research did you personally do to verify the safety of your seatbelt. What maintenance have you done to it to ensure that it works as intended? Pretty important life saving bit of equipment.
Edit: my presumption is that you(or the vast majority of the population) haven't done any research into your seatbelt because you trust in the car company and the safety rating requirements of your nation to ensure adequate protection.
You don’t need to worry about who made your seatbelt the same way you don’t need to worry about which specific programmers work for meta
You do need to worry about the repairability and safety rating of your car the same way you need to worry about the core descriptions of Meta’s products
Do you see?
Repairability in what way? Outside of changing the tires, a modern car is so complex with all the electronic systems in it that you can't really repair it yourself and you can't even reset the error codes because you don't have that special tablet to even hook into it.
For safety ratings, do you even know what they test and how without looking it up? I'd venture a guess that no, but I've been surprised before.
People maybe buy a Toyota because they once read that they just work or people may buy a Mercedes one day because their Dad used to always drive one, but they probably didn't sift through the damn safety and repairability ratings for it, they probably just bought it after a test drive. Its the same thing with anything really, how many times have you ever seen anyone question an app or a device that they are using when it just works and they don't even have to think about it? Its either 0 or close to it.
You can simply go look up how repairable various makes and models are considered by reputable sources it’s very simple research that a mere google will tell anyone. You’re actually making it out to be much more complicated than it is. They tell you exactly what the safety ratings are for and how they’re tested you just have to spend more than 0 minutes reading the first few google results.
People can voice ask Google simple questions they’re just not wanting to care about any of this and then are shocked when anything happens.
You admit it yourself they’re just lazy consumers lol
What you're positing here is a view of life that Margaret Thatcher loved. The idea is, "There is no society. There are no laws. There is no oversight. Everything, all responsibility, all of it is 1000% individual."
Of course in reality that's nonsense. We live in a world with laws that are sometimes enforced, where governments sometimes protect us, because we want them to, because that's good for us all.
But even if you believe in Thatcher's view, then you have the problem of corporations. You can't seriously argue that we should be responsible for everything ourselves, as individuals, and also that corporations should exist, because they are anti-individual.
No im telling you how it is and until we don’t live in such a world we have to take responsibility or it literally is your own fault
We all know this is the world and corporations do not follow laws and the state is weak and subservient to international capital
Until it’s not you can’t just close your eyes and trust the goddam corpos lmao
Your life must be hectic, im guessing you must also check the company and maintenance of every lift/ elevator / aircraft you use? By your rationale, itd be your fault if you were to be involved in an accident due to a company not maintaining equipment properly?
If companies are lying in their advertising to the general public, then that is something the companies are responsible for. You can blame the victims, but that's kind of stupid because there are so many people in the world who are not technically savvy. They don't have the resources, background, knowledge, and skills to evaluate whether what the company is telling them is true. That's why there are laws designed to protect consumers from lying companies.
Would it be great if everyone was an expert in everything? Yes. Are they? No. They never will be. That's why we have laws.
Do you think an attractive woman who has been raped multiple times should simply know better? Is she asking for it if she wears slightly more revealing clothing? How many times does she need to be sexually abused before it's her fault? How much responsibility does she have for her own abuse?
Somehow you’ve managed to connect basic consumer responsibility to being raped
There is literally something wrong with your brain if these are somehow remotely appropriate to compare
You gatta be real stupid to not realize that Facebook is harvesting your data.
insert pikachushockedface
What?!! No. The owner of WhatsApp would never lie to us.
Why am I not surprised? Whether there is no end-end encryption, they have a copy of every key, get the decrypted messages from the client, or can ask the client to surrender the key - it does not matter.
The point is that they never intended to leave users a secure environment. That would make the three latter agencies angry, and would bar themselves from rather interesting data on users.
It would not be surprising if found to be true. Difficult to see how the current business model operates at a profit. Their long term goal is the usual loss leader model until a monopoly is achieved and then slug us with ads, sell all the data, hike the price, etc. Sickening to watch them cosy up to fascists. They are probably supplying any and all the agencies with intelligence scraped from their user base. If Facebook were a person they would be a psychopath.
I mean, Mark Zuckerberg kind of is Facebook, and he's a psycho.
Obligatory
Shocking.
https://piefed.social/post/1699663#comment_9829227
Lol
Only a tech illiterate can expect privacy from a closed source program, open source is a requirement for both privacy and security.
I would argue that the vast majority of users don't use WhatsApp for privacy. In the UK at least, it's just the app everyone has and it works. I've actively tried to move friends over to signal, to limited success, but honestly it can be escaped how encryption is not it's killer IP.
Yup. I use Whatsapp to text my girlfriend and my work uses it as a group chat for road conditions or just shit talking.
If you're using it for secure purposes, you're part of the problem.
I never used WhatsApp, but what made people think they used e2e? I'm way passed blindly believing what any company says they do without proof. I'd expect some kind of key or certificate management in the app, is that present?
Heck.. my default is still to think every website does plaintext password storage. I can't prove it, but neither can they. Stop storing my passwords in plaintext lemmy! /s
People expect it what WhatsApp claims it's E2E encrypted at the start of each chat:
And also because at some point they hired Signal people to design E2EE for them, I think.
I don't think they hired them, they just use the open source code library that the signal app also uses.
I mean yeah, I get that.. but why would I believe that? Its trivial to add a label in an app and make it say that. I'm questioning trust here. My question should have rather been: why do people trust Meta will do exactly what they say? Its Meta, that immediately sends alarms to my brain saying to stay cautious. Like I said, there's no way to verify what that piece of text says and the people who would be interested in e2e encryption are also that kind of people who should know what a trusted authority is.
No inherent reason to believe that, but seems like lying about this should be illegal. The belief is in Meta's compliance with the law rather than in its ethics, which, according to these claims, is unfortunately an unfounded belief.
Why would the law matter? We clearly saw him bribe the president. It was public and in our faces.
Around a year ago WhatsApp had large ads that just said "no one else can read your messages." I don't think most people thought that some one could, which makes me wonder why they were paying so much to say it.
Any time they get asked questions like "Are my messages visible only to me?", they answer with a very canned response like "Your messages are encrypted from end-to-end and can't be read by anyone while in transit" ... or words to that effect. I have never seen them state that no analytics or telemetry is happening on the unencrypted side by the client. Which has always bothered me.
Because after N scandals, they needed to make sure people would trust them. Meta had never considered itself bound to any promise or commitment they ever made to anyone (users, ads customers, etc.). But you want a monopole, you need to make sure people see no issue with using your services.
And they're doing it again with Threads. And it works AGAIN, because they promised not to do anything evil. Pending the next inevitable scandal with users flabbergasted that Meta could have done it AGAIN.
Is anyone actually still using threads? I thought all the Twitter refugees ended up on Bluesky.
If I trust the numbers I found, Threads has 200M users, vs 2.5--3M for all of Mastodon's instances but-Threads.
Down the same road, again.
Back at the start WhatsApp wasn't free, although it was pretty cheap. Then Meta bought it and made it free. Some time after that, the founders left and started Signal.
The E2E encrypted protocol WhatsApp used to use was the Signal protocol. When the OG founders left and created Signal they revamped it, calling it the Signal V2 protocol. Whether WhatsApp still uses that original Signal protocol or not is probably not known to many people outside of Meta, but WhatsApp definitely used to be E2E encrypted prior to Meta's purchase.
I deleted my WhatsApp account around the time Meta announced they were merging all of their messaging stuff together, e.g. Facebook Messenger, Instagram etc.
Just assume any digital platform you're using isn't safe at this point.
Im not a big fan of meta and WhatsApp, but these claims are a bit much. Any employee gets access to messages through a well documented internal process? "No separate decryption step is required" , so the WhatsApp CLIENT is not doing any actual e2e encryption and no attempt at reverse engineering or traffic analysis has ever seen that this is the case?
Where can one see, what these whistleblowers have actually published? I would expect to see this "simple process" and how that interface actually works... And I would expect any journalist to request some proof (show me the last message i sent to Alice) before trusting an anonymous whistleblower making such an extraordinary claim.
From what I heard so far, that anonymous whistleblower could be a troll or an ex-employee who just wants to cause some trouble for meta.
We should not trust anything blindly, even if it fits with our view of the world. Meta is an evil company, but as long as there is no indication for these specific allegations to be true, we should treat them as unfounded allegations.
In principle the messages themselves could be E2E encrypted, but the closed-source WhatsApp client could transmit decryption keys to Meta HQ without anyone finding out. As long as the client or the client device is unsafe and not trusted, E2EE is not really effective. Which is why one should always demand a FOSS client for E2EE.
Of course we shouldn't trust anything blindly, but we also need to use common sense. Have we seen proof that what's claimed to be true is in fact true? No. But it might be true, and it's consistent with what Meta would do. So if your cautious minded, you should assume it's true for now while you go through the next few years of your life waiting for discovery.
It will be interesting to see if this goes anywhere. It looks like the claims are based on specific aspects of California law (put simply: wiretapping, privacy, and deceptive business practices). Do they have a strong case? I don't know, not worth my personal time to research state law on these issues.
Is there enough to go to court? Certainly the lawyers think so, and I agree. If Meta is claiming E2EE (which it is) and then immediately undercutting that by re-transmitting large numbers of messages to itself (which is alleged), that sure feels deceptive to me, and it's easy to think that a jury might agree.
It was obvious.
I would not be surprised at all if they'd have a backdoor way to filch data, or the key with which to decrypt backed up data.
More likely they just send the encryption key to the server after it's generated.
I thought they stole Signal's code ( I know it's open Source but still ... Taking free code to profit from it is quite a fucktard move) to achieve e2e encryption? Who could have thought they weren't honest in their intention!?
/S
They used Signal's code for the encryption and decryption, they just also took a copy of everyone's cryptographic keys with their own code.
They only lied by omission.
Slashdot. I have a very low 3 digit UID. I followed Rob Malda's blog before he registered the domain.
I remember having Netscape open on the site and reading it. I walked a couple blocks to by a pack of smokes. Got back home and refreshed the page. Noticed a new post with site registration available, so of course I did.
To this day I still get password reminder requests to my email that I never sent.
I still comment and sometimes get some people replying noticing the low UID.
Silly I know, but it's cool to me anyway.
I've always considered iTunes to be one of the worst pieces of software ever written, but WhatsApp is a very close second.
I'm sure the encryption was disabled post meta buyout IT JUST MAKES SENSE!
Facebook added the encryption in the first place because so many people were leaving for Signal and Threema (and Telegram but that's another security nightmare).
Telegram is more of a honeypot now than anything else
Even if that's all true, it's not evidence that the end to end encryption is broken.
That sort of debug access could simply be included in the clients.
I'm not sure if it's the encryption part you don't understand, the end to end, or both.
I understand perfectly well, it's you who doesn't.
If the illegitimate access happens on the client which is the endpoint of the e2e-encryption then it doesn't say anything about the e2e-encryption working or not working. On the endpoint the content is always available decrypted, for user consumption
an end to end encryption implementation is broken when secret keys leak, whether its intentional or not.
Nowhere in the given scenario do secret keys leak.
Ah, so you don't understand what the word user means. Got it.
The "encryption for two different receiving sides" part is the one that you, in turn, might have missed. WhatsApp client might just send messages to some additional technical party, which is not your buddy.
There is a distinct difference between not having end to end encryption, and bypassing it.
If you can bypass it in the middle it is by definition not end to end encryption. The entire point of end to end encryption is that only the endpoints are able to decrypt the messages and everyone in between only has access to the encrypted messages. If that's not the case that's just normal encryption not end to end.
I think we're dealing with weasel lawyer words here. Meta can boast that messages are E2E encrypted between you and the recipient, but that implies nothing about key storage or security, or about other channels through which the app could send message data before it is encrypted. It may be E2EE between you and the recipient, and also sent in plaintext to Meta. Plus E2EE of messages implies nothing about message metadata.
Your device is an endpoint, it's leaking the information to Meta, that isn't a MITM.
Unless you redefine the end in e2e to mean your eyes, it's still e2e encrypted.
Bypassing means it is not an end to end encryption. It is end to MITM; and MITM to end encryption. Where the man-in-the-middle is alleged to be Meta in this case.
MitM: Meta-in-the-Middle
JFC can nobody on Lemmy read?
The bypass is happening on your device, there is no MITM.
it is not. meta controls the keys. that’s how they’re accessing the messages
the article says they can access any message, from any user, from any time period, even deleted, instantly
to make this a client-side exploit would mean that messages would need to be constantly sent in the clear (not targeted per user) for years now… and someone would have noticed that
we know meta holds the encryption keys: that’s a known fact… it’s much much easier for them to simply decrypt everything they store
How?
Is the same not true of any app depending on centralized servers, e.g including signal?
And also Google & Apple can backdoor any app on any mobile device.
No. Signal encrypts every message on the device itself before sending to Signal servers. You can even confirm this yourself by looking at their github.
Whats app claims they do this but its impossible to confirm. Its extrenemly likely that either they dont encrypt at all or they have the decryption keys.
In The method described, it doesn't matter if Signal encrypt the message before it leaves your phone, the plaintext is still in the app and gets sent to Meta while also being encrypted with Meta's keys.
It's basically impossible to know this isn't happening based on reading source code, because the code to load widgets doesn't have to be remotely close to the messaging code, you'd have to read the entire signal code based.
There is way to know that the code you read on GitHub is the code Google/Apple install on your phone.
🤣🤣🤣😂
Bruv, before Signal launched they posted an entire whitepaper detailing their protocol, the working mechanisms of the system, and source code. So to reply to your 3 points:
If you don't understand how any of this works, it's just best not to comment.
What if the malicious actor is not Signal but Google or the hardware manufacturer?
Can we check that the encryption key generated by the device is not stored somewhere on the device? Same for the OS.
Can we check that the app running in memory is the same that is available for reproducible build checks?
Can we check that your and my apps at the moment are the same as the one security researchers tested?
The clients (apps) enforce key symmetry for your own keys, server identity, and the exchanged with the other person part of a conversation. Constantly. There is no way to MITM that.
The clients are open source, and audited regularly, and yes, builds are binary reproduceable and fingerprinted on release.
That's not to say someone can't build a malicious copy that does dumb stuff and put it in your phone to replace the other copy, but the server would catch and reject it if it's fingerprints don't match the previously known good copy, or a public version.
Now you're just coming up with weird things to justify the paranoia. None of this has anything to do with Signal itself, which is as secure as it gets.
Didn't I say that at the start of my questions? What's your point?
If I understand you correctly, you mean that Signal app checks itself and sends the result to the server that can then deny access to it? Is that what Signal does and what makes it difficult to spoof this fingerprint?
I don't think you answered any of my questions though since they weren't about Signal.
I'm just asking questions about security I don't know answers to, I'm not stating that's how things are.
I did answer your questions, but if I missed something, feel free to ask and I can clarify.
Why would any message be plaintext?
Fair you could have just said they have reproducible builds or linked to the docs: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/blob/main/reproducible-builds/README.md
Again you are missing the point of the attack
Back at you, even if you are right that signal is secure, the attack is not what you think it is.
What in the world are you talking about here, bud? Your comments are making zero sense.
Look, seriously, if my comment is being upvoted, it's because I responded to yours, and people understand what I am saying in response.
You, unfortunately, clearly do not understand what I'm saying because you do not grasp how any of this works.
Lmao, sure buddy pat yourself on the back because you got upvotes.
You're talking about E2E encryption as if it prevents
side-channelclient side attacks, but sure morons will upvotes because they also don't understand real world security.The only useful thing you've pointed out in your deluge of spam, is that Signal builds are reproducible which does protect against the attack described (as long as there isn't a backdoor in the published code)
That's literally what E2E encryption does. In order to attack it from outside you would have to break the encryption itself, and modern encryption is so robust that it would require quantum computing to break, and that capability hasn't been developed yet.
The only reason the other commenter's words sound like spam to you is because you don't understand it, which you plainly reveal when you say "(as long as there isn't a backdoor in the published [audited] code)
Do you know what size channel attacks are? Because nothing you've even tried to bring up describes one at all, or how it applies to your original comments.
about the 3rd, is the end apk file downloaded by a useer on the playstore reproducible? could google add stuff to the apk before the user downloading it? do users ever bother checking if the apk hash matches the one from the reproducible build?
yes, that's why it's called fingerprinting:
it's a kind of mathematical function that takes the entire code as input and outputs a unique result.
the result is just some string of symbols (which really just represent a unique string of 1's and 0's).
this unique string of characters is, as mentioned, unique for any given input.
this string can then be compared to any arbitrary other string, and if they match, then you know it's the same code.
so in the case of signal anybody can download the source, compile it, and verify that it matches the fingerprint of the compiled code on their own device.
that's why it can't be faked: you compare the already compiled code.
if even a single digit of the code is out of place, it's not going to result in the same string, and thus immediately get flagged as a mismatch.
it's mathematically impossible to fake.
While I agree with you I did just want to point out one thing.
This:
Is not entirely true persay, every hashing function does have collisions that can occur. But the likely hood that someone baked an exploit in that kept the application functioning while adding their backdoor all the while somehow creating a hash collision with the original fingerprint is practically zero and honestly if someone did pull that off, fucking hats off because that has to be some sort of math and coding wizard beyond most. I should also point out that the file size would most likely/have to be different so there should be other methods of detecting the compromised build regardless.
Sorry I know that was very pedantic of me but I did want to call that out because its technically possible but the actual likely hood has to be so miniscule its almost irrelevant along with the fact that other tells would surely exist.
For most: yes, there is a risk that the vendor has included a backdoor. There is also the risk that they are straight-up lying about how their service operates.
For Signal in particular: You can verify that their claims are true because you can audit the source code.
The Signal client is open-source, so any interested parties can verify that it is A) not sending the user's private keys to any server, and B) not transmitting any messages that are not encrypted with those keys.
Even if you choose to obtain Signal from the Google Play Store (which comes with its own set of problems), you can verify its integrity because Signal uses reproducible builds. That means it is possible for you to download the public source code, compile it yourself, and verify that the published binary is identical. See: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/tree/main/reproducible-builds
You might not have the skills or patience to do that yourself, but Signal has undergone professional audits if anyone ever discovers a backdoor, it will be major news.
You are more likely to be compromised at the OS level (e.g. screen recorders, key loggers, Microsoft Recall, etc.) than from Signal itself.
Signal could still (at least for a short period of time) read everything. Whisper System just has to push a Signal Update that no longer encrypts. It would probably be noticed pretty soon. And no not because of the source code. The source code is what they claim to ise to build the applications but they could easily apply patches before they build. You'd have to reverse engineer the compiled applications ro see if there is code that's probably not in the source.
This kind of problem is typically way smaller in projects that actively encourage building the clients from source yourself - which Whister System/Signal does not.
Theres so many ways to check for that that don't require decompiling the app.
You can straight compare the downloaded binary with a locally compiled binary to see if they match.
You can check the hash of app. Changing some lines of code and getting the same hash is so unlikely to be effectively impossible.
If for some reason Signal decided to do what you claim, it'd destroy thier credibility, be caught almost immediately, and only work once before the whole project gets forked, and would be true of any alternative.
This shows that you don't understand e2e encryption. Watch a video about how comparing the keys can verify that no man in the middle attack is happening.
Article states that the is no technical proof. There are other ways to read messages or meta data without breaking encryption.
This shows you don't understand the exploit being used.
Go hang out with Alice & Bob all you want, they aren't breaking encryption.
I guess c/technology is the same as r/technology, full Smug fools that don't read articles or understand real world security, but think they are 1337 hax0rm3n
Sorry but you’ll need to hold the L on this one. If I encrypt a message with public key material for which the only private key material that can decrypt the message is in only my possession, it doesn’t matter if the message passes centralized servers.
I’m not trying to be rude, that’s just how it works.
People not understanding how security threats actually work is why everything is so broken these days.
If you do it by hand sure.
If you put the message into an app then the app is trusted to not leak the message. What is described in the article is that Whatsapp can instruct clients to send a copies of the message from the app to their server.
There is nothing stopping any messaging app doing this, having decentralized servers and 3rd party clients wouldn't stop this but it would make it much easier to protect yourself from the attack.
Your threat model seems to be an app whose published source code doesn't match the published app, and whose published version uses a side channel not in the source code to leak messages in plaintext to a server. If that's what we're worried about then decentralization of the app's main messaging channel makes no difference. The sneaky side channel could still be there in any app, centralised or decentralized.
That's a theoretical worry to be mitigated through integrity checks on published open-source apps. The worry with Meta and WhatsApp is much more immediate: a known bad actor with a closed-source app, many domains they could use to leak keys or unencrypted messages, and a fawning relationship with the fascist and surveillance-hungry US Government. I'd still put significantly more trust in Signal even though it is centralised.
You're right decentralization would help because you could isolate yourself from the corporate server sending the instructions for you to leak the messages.
But ultimately you're right integrity checks of apps are a better way to address this and fortunately it seems Signal do produce reproducible builds. https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/blob/main/reproducible-builds/README.md so is secure from this kind of attack (unless there is a backdoor in the published code)
Even in an "insecure" app without air-gapped systems or manual encryption, creating a backdoor to access plaintext messages is still very difficult if the app is well audited, open source, and encrypts messages with the recipient's public key or a symmetric key before sending ciphertext to a third-party server.
If you trust the client-side implementation and the mathematics behind the symmetric and asymmetric algorithms, messages remains secure even if the centralized server is compromised. The client-side implementation can be verified by inspecting the source code if the app is open source and the device is trusted (for example, there is no ring-zero vulnerability).
The key exchange itself remains somewhat vulnerable if there is no other secure channel to verify that the correct public keys were exchanged. However, once the public keys have been correctly exchanged, the communication is secure.
Well audited is key, this attack likely works by doing something like adding Meta to the list of trusted devices, then hiding itself from the list (either because of code in the client or because it the meta device is only added for a moment), so the backdoor wouldn't be send_all_messages_to_hq(), it would be in the code to list trusted devices, either explicitly hiding some devices or some sort of refresh timer that's known so you can avoid being there when the UI is updated).
Or it works through the some other mechanism that still preserves E2E encryption.
I assumed that not only the entire app but also the entire client device had been audited. This was a client-side attack, not Meta momentarily adding itself to the trusted-device list. I'm confident it was a client-side attack because it would be impossible to hide even a momentary change in keys from the client without modifying the client app to conceal such a change.
I’m not following. In the WhatsApp case, yes, because we can’t see how those keys are managed. In the Signal case, we can. So the centralized server has zero impact on the privacy of the message. If we trust the keys are possessed only by the generating device, then how does the encrypted message become compromised?
I’m not talking about anonymity, only message privacy. No different than any of the other proxies or routers along the way. If they don’t have the key, the message is not readable.
Now I'm curious: how does the person you're messaging get the same key to decrypt the message you send?
I'm genuinely curious.
They share it with you. Their public key is generated by them. You encrypt a message to them with their public key. They use their private key to decrypt it.
I want to add before I get completely roasted here, that this is intentionally reductive. Signal actually uses a much more interesting multikey sharing algorithm, double ratchet. This uses onetime keypairs, and really is worth reading about.
The centralized server is only important because it sends you the message to get around the encryption (either adding a new client to your list of trusted clients or in some other way getting your client to send your messages to Meta).
Because the client is capable of adding the backdoor, it isn't comprosing the encryption. When you add a desktop client to your Signal account it doesn't break E2E encryption either but your messages are visible in more places. That (or something like it) is what is being described, Meta aren't decrypting your messages as they go through their E2E network, they are tapping them client side.
Dude...your comments here clearly display that you do not have a single clue as to how cryptography works. You should just pack it up in this thread and head on down the road.
Dude, your comments clearly display that you do not have a single clue as to how security works. You should just pack it up in this thread and head on down the road.
WhatsApp's cryptography isn't broken, the app is.
🤣🤣🤣
You need a juice and a nap, Ke-mo sah-bee.
The "exploit being used" is closed-source, proprietary code sending data where it says it doesn't.
People have already explained to you how signal's open-source, auditable, and reproducible code prevents the possibility of a similar exploit.
You're the smug fool who doesn't understand cybersecurity. How much is zuck paying you to say "signal's just as bad as whatapp"?
Nobody is saying signal is just as bad, simply that it's not invulnerable to this kind of attack, even with reproducible builds, especially as we don't know how the attack works.
When is the last time you checked the linked-devices tab in signal?
You've already gotten a lot of responses about the first claim.
But to answer the second one:
Why would they mess with a specific app if they already control the OS? They could read everything they ever wanted from memory without anyone noticing.
It's a lot easier to ship 1 app with a backdoor than reconstruct messages by scanning memory.
And what if your target is using a different app for messaging?
I agree that blindly going trough memory isn't the best solution. To catch everything, a keylogger as part of the input-handler of the OS would probably be the way to go.