cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/50803841

Canada helped build local government capacity in Ukraine before the war. The Council of Europe’s Congress has now called on the world to do so again. Canada should answer that call.

Op-ed by Tamara Krawchenko, Associate Professor, School of Public Administration, University of Victoria, Canada.

[...]

The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe recently called for local and national authorities to work together to help Ukraine recover and rebuild four years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of the country.

The message is clear: cities and regions must lead, and their counterparts around the world should help them do it. The congress also calls on Russia to pay for the damage it has caused, pointing to frozen Russian assets worldwide as one source for those funds — an acknowledgment that recovery cannot wait for the war to end, since communities are already rebuilding under fire.

[...]

Behind every statistic is a community struggling to survive — a mayor trying to keep schools open under missile attacks; a municipal council managing hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons with dwindling resources; a city engineer repairing the same water system for the third time after it was bombed yet again.

[...]

Local and regional authorities across Ukraine face these situations every day. And it is precisely because the challenges are so local — tied to specific communities and capacities — that the response must also be local.

Ukrainian decentralization reforms since 2014 have expanded the fiscal capacity of the country’s municipalities, enabling them to respond to the unprecedented shocks of war far more effectively than before. In fact, local budget revenues quintupled between 2014 and 2021.

Russia’s [full-scale] invasion disrupted these reforms.

[...]

The call to action by the congress asks local and regional authorities in Council of Europe member states to use “existing co-operation platforms and bilateral partnerships to offer practical support to their Ukrainian counterparts.”

It’s an appeal for cities that have solved difficult problems — managing mass displacement, rebuilding after disaster, reforming service delivery — to share what they know with Ukrainian cities doing the same under fire.

City-to-city partnerships are fundamentally different from top-down aid. They are peer relationships built on what scholars call horizontal assistance — the exchange of practical knowledge and structural social capital between cities navigating similar challenges.

[...]

History offers clear guidance on what works. Comparative analysis of post-war and post-disaster reconstruction experiences identifies local community engagement and bottom-up leadership as the single most consistent factor separating successful from failed reconstruction.

[...]

Canada has been here before. Beginning in 2010, the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM), financed by the Canadian government through Global Affairs Canada, built exactly this kind of peer network in Ukraine through the Partnership for Local Economic Development and Democratic Governance.

The $19.5-million, six-year initiative worked directly with 16 Ukrainian cities to strengthen local democracy, support small and medium-sized businesses and advance decentralization.

FCM’s municipal experts worked alongside counterparts in cities like Lviv and Dnipro, co-publishing Ukraine’s first municipal guide to local economic development and helping local governments design collaborative regional projects. A key partner throughout was the Association of Ukrainian Cities, a key municipal advocacy organization.

That program ended, but the relationships it built did not. And the decentralization reforms it supported are now widely credited — by the congress’s call to action itself, the OECD and scholars of Ukrainian resilience — with giving Ukrainian local authorities the capacity to respond as effectively as they have to the shocks of war.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/50803841

Canada helped build local government capacity in Ukraine before the war. The Council of Europe’s Congress has now called on the world to do so again. Canada should answer that call.

Op-ed by Tamara Krawchenko, Associate Professor, School of Public Administration, University of Victoria, Canada.

[...]

The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe recently called for local and national authorities to work together to help Ukraine recover and rebuild four years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of the country.

The message is clear: cities and regions must lead, and their counterparts around the world should help them do it. The congress also calls on Russia to pay for the damage it has caused, pointing to frozen Russian assets worldwide as one source for those funds — an acknowledgment that recovery cannot wait for the war to end, since communities are already rebuilding under fire.

[...]

Behind every statistic is a community struggling to survive — a mayor trying to keep schools open under missile attacks; a municipal council managing hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons with dwindling resources; a city engineer repairing the same water system for the third time after it was bombed yet again.

[...]

Local and regional authorities across Ukraine face these situations every day. And it is precisely because the challenges are so local — tied to specific communities and capacities — that the response must also be local.

Ukrainian decentralization reforms since 2014 have expanded the fiscal capacity of the country’s municipalities, enabling them to respond to the unprecedented shocks of war far more effectively than before. In fact, local budget revenues quintupled between 2014 and 2021.

Russia’s [full-scale] invasion disrupted these reforms.

[...]

The call to action by the congress asks local and regional authorities in Council of Europe member states to use “existing co-operation platforms and bilateral partnerships to offer practical support to their Ukrainian counterparts.”

It’s an appeal for cities that have solved difficult problems — managing mass displacement, rebuilding after disaster, reforming service delivery — to share what they know with Ukrainian cities doing the same under fire.

City-to-city partnerships are fundamentally different from top-down aid. They are peer relationships built on what scholars call horizontal assistance — the exchange of practical knowledge and structural social capital between cities navigating similar challenges.

[...]

History offers clear guidance on what works. Comparative analysis of post-war and post-disaster reconstruction experiences identifies local community engagement and bottom-up leadership as the single most consistent factor separating successful from failed reconstruction.

[...]

Canada has been here before. Beginning in 2010, the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM), financed by the Canadian government through Global Affairs Canada, built exactly this kind of peer network in Ukraine through the Partnership for Local Economic Development and Democratic Governance.

The $19.5-million, six-year initiative worked directly with 16 Ukrainian cities to strengthen local democracy, support small and medium-sized businesses and advance decentralization.

FCM’s municipal experts worked alongside counterparts in cities like Lviv and Dnipro, co-publishing Ukraine’s first municipal guide to local economic development and helping local governments design collaborative regional projects. A key partner throughout was the Association of Ukrainian Cities, a key municipal advocacy organization.

That program ended, but the relationships it built did not. And the decentralization reforms it supported are now widely credited — by the congress’s call to action itself, the OECD and scholars of Ukrainian resilience — with giving Ukrainian local authorities the capacity to respond as effectively as they have to the shocks of war.

[...]

Canada helped build local government capacity in Ukraine before the war. The Council of Europe’s Congress has now called on the world to do so again. Canada should answer that call.

Op-ed by Tamara Krawchenko, Associate Professor, School of Public Administration, University of Victoria, Canada.

[...]

The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe recently called for local and national authorities to work together to help Ukraine recover and rebuild four years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of the country.

The message is clear: cities and regions must lead, and their counterparts around the world should help them do it. The congress also calls on Russia to pay for the damage it has caused, pointing to frozen Russian assets worldwide as one source for those funds — an acknowledgment that recovery cannot wait for the war to end, since communities are already rebuilding under fire.

[...]

Behind every statistic is a community struggling to survive — a mayor trying to keep schools open under missile attacks; a municipal council managing hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons with dwindling resources; a city engineer repairing the same water system for the third time after it was bombed yet again.

[...]

Local and regional authorities across Ukraine face these situations every day. And it is precisely because the challenges are so local — tied to specific communities and capacities — that the response must also be local.

Ukrainian decentralization reforms since 2014 have expanded the fiscal capacity of the country’s municipalities, enabling them to respond to the unprecedented shocks of war far more effectively than before. In fact, local budget revenues quintupled between 2014 and 2021.

Russia’s [full-scale] invasion disrupted these reforms.

[...]

The call to action by the congress asks local and regional authorities in Council of Europe member states to use “existing co-operation platforms and bilateral partnerships to offer practical support to their Ukrainian counterparts.”

It’s an appeal for cities that have solved difficult problems — managing mass displacement, rebuilding after disaster, reforming service delivery — to share what they know with Ukrainian cities doing the same under fire.

City-to-city partnerships are fundamentally different from top-down aid. They are peer relationships built on what scholars call horizontal assistance — the exchange of practical knowledge and structural social capital between cities navigating similar challenges.

[...]

History offers clear guidance on what works. Comparative analysis of post-war and post-disaster reconstruction experiences identifies local community engagement and bottom-up leadership as the single most consistent factor separating successful from failed reconstruction.

[...]

Canada has been here before. Beginning in 2010, the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM), financed by the Canadian government through Global Affairs Canada, built exactly this kind of peer network in Ukraine through the Partnership for Local Economic Development and Democratic Governance.

The $19.5-million, six-year initiative worked directly with 16 Ukrainian cities to strengthen local democracy, support small and medium-sized businesses and advance decentralization.

FCM’s municipal experts worked alongside counterparts in cities like Lviv and Dnipro, co-publishing Ukraine’s first municipal guide to local economic development and helping local governments design collaborative regional projects. A key partner throughout was the Association of Ukrainian Cities, a key municipal advocacy organization.

That program ended, but the relationships it built did not. And the decentralization reforms it supported are now widely credited — by the congress’s call to action itself, the OECD and scholars of Ukrainian resilience — with giving Ukrainian local authorities the capacity to respond as effectively as they have to the shocks of war.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/43807418

...

A key component of the study [to be conducted in Romania] is the characterisation of low-conflict sites—areas with minimal risk to biodiversity and communities and which meet essential technical criteria for renewable energy development. These areas are broader than the RAAs defined in Directive (EU) 2023/2413, and while not all low-conflict sites will become RAAs, mapping them nationwide will support responsible renewable deployment both within and beyond designated acceleration zones.

...

Beyond identifying low-conflict areas for clean energy development, the study will serve as a dialogue platform bringing together national and local authorities, grid operators, energy associations, academia and civil society. This collaborative space will help address challenges, share perspectives and strengthen informed decision-making in shaping Romania’s renewable energy future.

...

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/43807418

...

A key component of the study [to be conducted in Romania] is the characterisation of low-conflict sites—areas with minimal risk to biodiversity and communities and which meet essential technical criteria for renewable energy development. These areas are broader than the RAAs defined in Directive (EU) 2023/2413, and while not all low-conflict sites will become RAAs, mapping them nationwide will support responsible renewable deployment both within and beyond designated acceleration zones.

...

Beyond identifying low-conflict areas for clean energy development, the study will serve as a dialogue platform bringing together national and local authorities, grid operators, energy associations, academia and civil society. This collaborative space will help address challenges, share perspectives and strengthen informed decision-making in shaping Romania’s renewable energy future.

...

...

A key component of the study [to be conducted in Romania] is the characterisation of low-conflict sites—areas with minimal risk to biodiversity and communities and which meet essential technical criteria for renewable energy development. These areas are broader than the RAAs defined in Directive (EU) 2023/2413, and while not all low-conflict sites will become RAAs, mapping them nationwide will support responsible renewable deployment both within and beyond designated acceleration zones.

...

Beyond identifying low-conflict areas for clean energy development, the study will serve as a dialogue platform bringing together national and local authorities, grid operators, energy associations, academia and civil society. This collaborative space will help address challenges, share perspectives and strengthen informed decision-making in shaping Romania’s renewable energy future.

...

This is an op-ed by Sir Niall Ferguson, Milbank Family senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University; and Moritz Schularick is president of the Kiel Institute for the World Economy.

Archived / Unpaywalled

...

Germany’s rearmament is not going nearly fast enough. While Germany and Europe urgently need more weapons, at the current pace it will take years for them to roll off the production line and to constitute an arsenal sufficient to deter Russia. In no other area will Germany invest as much money in the coming years. And in no area is the absence of economic rationality more pronounced. Without swift changes, Germany is on a path to waste billions in taxpayers’ money for the delayed delivery of partly outdated defence capabilities.

Nearly four years after Russia’s assault on Ukraine, large German defence producers still work in single shifts, five days a week, instead of three shifts, seven days a week. The current production rate for the Taurus long-range guided missile system is only a few a month. The production of the Iris-T air defence system — which could provide crucial support to defend Ukraine’s energy infrastructure this winter and which is also essential for closing gaps in Europe’s air defence — is positively artisanal.

...

At its heart, this is a task of industrial scaling, something German industry is well placed to deliver. As economic historians, we know that without the coordinating hand of the government and economic expertise, this kind of crash rearmament programme will not happen fast enough. ... the obvious path would be to create a national defence industrial board to assess resources, set quantitative production goals, negotiate capacity with industry and fast-track dual-use innovation. ... "German rearmament" are two ominous words for historians, just as "state co-ordination" is a phrase we tend to eschew as believers in freemarket economics. However, in the face of an increasingly dangerous and heavily armed Russia, co-ordinated rearmament is imperative. Above all, it needs to happen at warp speed. ...

Berlin has woken up to the Russian threat, but its thinking is stuck in the past ... British readers of a certain age may find it hard to be enthusiastic about German rearmament. As historians, we understand their unease. However, this is not the 1910s or the 1930s. The 2020s are a time when the UK has been in a mutual defence alliance with Germany for close to 80 years; ... The arguments for a more rapid and technologically advanced German rearmament are more than just narrowly military. They are also economic and strategic. We have four recommendations that add up to an "Operation Warp Speed" for German rearmament. ...

...

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/41779805

[As a personal note by OP: This is about Australia, but it perfectly applies to any democracy on the globe as well imho.]

Warnings this week from the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) about sabotage threats marked an important shift in tone.

And they raise important questions about how the Australian government should respond.

Breaking from past practice, ASIO Director-General Mike Burgess said Chinese state-linked hackers have scanned, mapped and in some cases infiltrated Australian critical infrastructure.

According to Burgess, these groups are no longer focused on stealing information. They are preparing to disrupt or shut down key systems in a future crisis.

...

Burgess described [that] this threat does not involve persuasion or interference in debate. It is about the ability to disable telecommunications, shut down water systems, interrupt electricity supplies or damage the financial system.

This is preparation to use coercion during a crisis. One can imagine a scenario where Australia’s ability to respond to a blockade or invasion of Taiwan is hampered by a shutdown of critical infrastructure.

Burgess is therefore right to highlight the seriousness of the threat. China has shown that control of digital systems is central to geopolitical competition. Maintaining access to foreign infrastructure is a strategic advantage. As Australia becomes more reliant on digital networks, weaknesses in those systems become national security concerns.

...

There is, however, a second issue that deserves attention. In responding to foreign cyber threats, Australia risks adopting some of the very same digital tools used in authoritarian states such as Russia and China.

Research on digital authoritarianism shows that many authoritarian governments use control of digital networks to manage their own populations. They monitor citizens, limit information and use technology to enforce political order.

...

Burgess’ warning suggests this model is being exported. The aim is to control digital life at home, but also to gain the ability to interfere with digital systems overseas if needed.

In recent years, Australian governments have proposed measures that go well beyond traditional cybersecurity. These include mandatory age checks for social media, strict online limits for minors and expanding the duties of technology companies to assist with national security goals.

These proposals are framed as necessary for public safety. Yet they show a willingness to extend state power deeper into digital life.

...

Burgess’ speech at a business conference reinforces this trend. He addressed government agencies but also corporate boards, telling them national security is now their responsibility, as well.

Much of Australia’s critical infrastructure is owned or operated by private companies. Expecting these companies to act as extensions of national security policy risks blurring the line between public and private roles.

...

A defining feature of digital authoritarianism is the merger of state security priorities with corporate behaviour. If this boundary weakens, Australia could slowly move toward practices it has long opposed.

It is possible to strengthen national resilience without taking this path. A democratic society can defend its networks and deter cyber threats while maintaining openness and accountability.

Burgess is correct that Australia faces a serious and evolving challenge. China’s cyber operations reflect wider geopolitical changes. But an effective response requires protecting both infrastructure and democratic norms.

...

Stronger cyber defences are necessary, but they must come with clear limits on state power, transparent rules for data access and protections for speech.

China’s cyber operations, which are part of a wider strategic contest, are indeed a serious threat. But if Australia reacts by expanding security powers without restraint, it risks weakening the freedoms it aims to defend.

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/41779805

[As a personal note by OP: This is about Australia, but it perfectly applies to any democracy on the globe as well imho.]

Warnings this week from the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) about sabotage threats marked an important shift in tone.

And they raise important questions about how the Australian government should respond.

Breaking from past practice, ASIO Director-General Mike Burgess said Chinese state-linked hackers have scanned, mapped and in some cases infiltrated Australian critical infrastructure.

According to Burgess, these groups are no longer focused on stealing information. They are preparing to disrupt or shut down key systems in a future crisis.

...

Burgess described [that] this threat does not involve persuasion or interference in debate. It is about the ability to disable telecommunications, shut down water systems, interrupt electricity supplies or damage the financial system.

This is preparation to use coercion during a crisis. One can imagine a scenario where Australia’s ability to respond to a blockade or invasion of Taiwan is hampered by a shutdown of critical infrastructure.

Burgess is therefore right to highlight the seriousness of the threat. China has shown that control of digital systems is central to geopolitical competition. Maintaining access to foreign infrastructure is a strategic advantage. As Australia becomes more reliant on digital networks, weaknesses in those systems become national security concerns.

...

There is, however, a second issue that deserves attention. In responding to foreign cyber threats, Australia risks adopting some of the very same digital tools used in authoritarian states such as Russia and China.

Research on digital authoritarianism shows that many authoritarian governments use control of digital networks to manage their own populations. They monitor citizens, limit information and use technology to enforce political order.

...

Burgess’ warning suggests this model is being exported. The aim is to control digital life at home, but also to gain the ability to interfere with digital systems overseas if needed.

In recent years, Australian governments have proposed measures that go well beyond traditional cybersecurity. These include mandatory age checks for social media, strict online limits for minors and expanding the duties of technology companies to assist with national security goals.

These proposals are framed as necessary for public safety. Yet they show a willingness to extend state power deeper into digital life.

...

Burgess’ speech at a business conference reinforces this trend. He addressed government agencies but also corporate boards, telling them national security is now their responsibility, as well.

Much of Australia’s critical infrastructure is owned or operated by private companies. Expecting these companies to act as extensions of national security policy risks blurring the line between public and private roles.

...

A defining feature of digital authoritarianism is the merger of state security priorities with corporate behaviour. If this boundary weakens, Australia could slowly move toward practices it has long opposed.

It is possible to strengthen national resilience without taking this path. A democratic society can defend its networks and deter cyber threats while maintaining openness and accountability.

Burgess is correct that Australia faces a serious and evolving challenge. China’s cyber operations reflect wider geopolitical changes. But an effective response requires protecting both infrastructure and democratic norms.

...

Stronger cyber defences are necessary, but they must come with clear limits on state power, transparent rules for data access and protections for speech.

China’s cyber operations, which are part of a wider strategic contest, are indeed a serious threat. But if Australia reacts by expanding security powers without restraint, it risks weakening the freedoms it aims to defend.

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/41779805

[As a personal note by OP: This is about Australia, but it perfectly applies to any democracy on the globe as well imho.]

Warnings this week from the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) about sabotage threats marked an important shift in tone.

And they raise important questions about how the Australian government should respond.

Breaking from past practice, ASIO Director-General Mike Burgess said Chinese state-linked hackers have scanned, mapped and in some cases infiltrated Australian critical infrastructure.

According to Burgess, these groups are no longer focused on stealing information. They are preparing to disrupt or shut down key systems in a future crisis.

...

Burgess described [that] this threat does not involve persuasion or interference in debate. It is about the ability to disable telecommunications, shut down water systems, interrupt electricity supplies or damage the financial system.

This is preparation to use coercion during a crisis. One can imagine a scenario where Australia’s ability to respond to a blockade or invasion of Taiwan is hampered by a shutdown of critical infrastructure.

Burgess is therefore right to highlight the seriousness of the threat. China has shown that control of digital systems is central to geopolitical competition. Maintaining access to foreign infrastructure is a strategic advantage. As Australia becomes more reliant on digital networks, weaknesses in those systems become national security concerns.

...

There is, however, a second issue that deserves attention. In responding to foreign cyber threats, Australia risks adopting some of the very same digital tools used in authoritarian states such as Russia and China.

Research on digital authoritarianism shows that many authoritarian governments use control of digital networks to manage their own populations. They monitor citizens, limit information and use technology to enforce political order.

...

Burgess’ warning suggests this model is being exported. The aim is to control digital life at home, but also to gain the ability to interfere with digital systems overseas if needed.

In recent years, Australian governments have proposed measures that go well beyond traditional cybersecurity. These include mandatory age checks for social media, strict online limits for minors and expanding the duties of technology companies to assist with national security goals.

These proposals are framed as necessary for public safety. Yet they show a willingness to extend state power deeper into digital life.

...

Burgess’ speech at a business conference reinforces this trend. He addressed government agencies but also corporate boards, telling them national security is now their responsibility, as well.

Much of Australia’s critical infrastructure is owned or operated by private companies. Expecting these companies to act as extensions of national security policy risks blurring the line between public and private roles.

...

A defining feature of digital authoritarianism is the merger of state security priorities with corporate behaviour. If this boundary weakens, Australia could slowly move toward practices it has long opposed.

It is possible to strengthen national resilience without taking this path. A democratic society can defend its networks and deter cyber threats while maintaining openness and accountability.

Burgess is correct that Australia faces a serious and evolving challenge. China’s cyber operations reflect wider geopolitical changes. But an effective response requires protecting both infrastructure and democratic norms.

...

Stronger cyber defences are necessary, but they must come with clear limits on state power, transparent rules for data access and protections for speech.

China’s cyber operations, which are part of a wider strategic contest, are indeed a serious threat. But if Australia reacts by expanding security powers without restraint, it risks weakening the freedoms it aims to defend.

[As a personal note by OP: This is about Australia, but it perfectly applies to any democracy on the globe as well imho.]

Warnings this week from the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) about sabotage threats marked an important shift in tone.

And they raise important questions about how the Australian government should respond.

Breaking from past practice, ASIO Director-General Mike Burgess said Chinese state-linked hackers have scanned, mapped and in some cases infiltrated Australian critical infrastructure.

According to Burgess, these groups are no longer focused on stealing information. They are preparing to disrupt or shut down key systems in a future crisis.

...

Burgess described [that] this threat does not involve persuasion or interference in debate. It is about the ability to disable telecommunications, shut down water systems, interrupt electricity supplies or damage the financial system.

This is preparation to use coercion during a crisis. One can imagine a scenario where Australia’s ability to respond to a blockade or invasion of Taiwan is hampered by a shutdown of critical infrastructure.

Burgess is therefore right to highlight the seriousness of the threat. China has shown that control of digital systems is central to geopolitical competition. Maintaining access to foreign infrastructure is a strategic advantage. As Australia becomes more reliant on digital networks, weaknesses in those systems become national security concerns.

...

There is, however, a second issue that deserves attention. In responding to foreign cyber threats, Australia risks adopting some of the very same digital tools used in authoritarian states such as Russia and China.

Research on digital authoritarianism shows that many authoritarian governments use control of digital networks to manage their own populations. They monitor citizens, limit information and use technology to enforce political order.

...

Burgess’ warning suggests this model is being exported. The aim is to control digital life at home, but also to gain the ability to interfere with digital systems overseas if needed.

In recent years, Australian governments have proposed measures that go well beyond traditional cybersecurity. These include mandatory age checks for social media, strict online limits for minors and expanding the duties of technology companies to assist with national security goals.

These proposals are framed as necessary for public safety. Yet they show a willingness to extend state power deeper into digital life.

...

Burgess’ speech at a business conference reinforces this trend. He addressed government agencies but also corporate boards, telling them national security is now their responsibility, as well.

Much of Australia’s critical infrastructure is owned or operated by private companies. Expecting these companies to act as extensions of national security policy risks blurring the line between public and private roles.

...

A defining feature of digital authoritarianism is the merger of state security priorities with corporate behaviour. If this boundary weakens, Australia could slowly move toward practices it has long opposed.

It is possible to strengthen national resilience without taking this path. A democratic society can defend its networks and deter cyber threats while maintaining openness and accountability.

Burgess is correct that Australia faces a serious and evolving challenge. China’s cyber operations reflect wider geopolitical changes. But an effective response requires protecting both infrastructure and democratic norms.

...

Stronger cyber defences are necessary, but they must come with clear limits on state power, transparent rules for data access and protections for speech.

China’s cyber operations, which are part of a wider strategic contest, are indeed a serious threat. But if Australia reacts by expanding security powers without restraint, it risks weakening the freedoms it aims to defend.

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/41645330

Archived version

Here is s brief summary by a news agency: Chinese goods dumping started before tariffs, ECB study finds

Weak domestic demand appears to be the missing link in explaining China’s strong exports to Europe – more so than tariff-related trade diversion, according to an analysis by the European Central Bank (ECB).

Escalating trade tensions between the United States and China might result in a further diversion of Chinese exports to Europe. However, the rise in China’s exports to the EU predates the latest tensions and coincides instead with the onset of weakness in domestic demand in China, the ECB says.

In the fourth quarter of 2024 the average monthly value of domestic sales was around four times higher than total exports and over 28 times larger than exports to the United States. This suggests the pool of goods that could be redirected to the EU is much broader than trade data alone would suggest. Redirecting even a small share of domestic sales abroad could boost overall exports – including to the EU – more than a sizeable diversion of exports from the United States.

The ECB argues that the start of rising exports and slowing imports dates back to 2021, when China's crisis in its domestic real estate market - typically an import-sensitive sector - sharply curtailed household demand.

At the same time, state-imposed manufacturing investment created overcapacity in industries that would otherwise face market-driven constraints, which eventually resulted in fierce price wars in Chinese home markets forcing companies to seek relief in exports.

The ECB writes:

This has eroded profit margins and discouraged spending in a deflationary environment with significant labour slack – prompting firms to redirect sales toward foreign markets.This shift reflects the “vent-for-surplus” theory of international trade, which posits that a demand-driven decline in domestic sales generates excess capacity that can be redirected abroad. The mechanism assumes fixed investment in the short term, which is particularly relevant in China, where investment is often guided by central planning. To expand abroad, firms must gain competitiveness in foreign markets. They typically do so by reducing short-run marginal costs and prices, or by accepting narrower profit margins, and in some cases even losses.

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/41645330

Archived version

Here is s brief summary by a news agency: Chinese goods dumping started before tariffs, ECB study finds

Weak domestic demand appears to be the missing link in explaining China’s strong exports to Europe – more so than tariff-related trade diversion, according to an analysis by the European Central Bank (ECB).

Escalating trade tensions between the United States and China might result in a further diversion of Chinese exports to Europe. However, the rise in China’s exports to the EU predates the latest tensions and coincides instead with the onset of weakness in domestic demand in China, the ECB says.

In the fourth quarter of 2024 the average monthly value of domestic sales was around four times higher than total exports and over 28 times larger than exports to the United States. This suggests the pool of goods that could be redirected to the EU is much broader than trade data alone would suggest. Redirecting even a small share of domestic sales abroad could boost overall exports – including to the EU – more than a sizeable diversion of exports from the United States.

The ECB argues that the start of rising exports and slowing imports dates back to 2021, when China's crisis in its domestic real estate market - typically an import-sensitive sector - sharply curtailed household demand.

At the same time, state-imposed manufacturing investment created overcapacity in industries that would otherwise face market-driven constraints, which eventually resulted in fierce price wars in Chinese home markets forcing companies to seek relief in exports.

The ECB writes:

This has eroded profit margins and discouraged spending in a deflationary environment with significant labour slack – prompting firms to redirect sales toward foreign markets.This shift reflects the “vent-for-surplus” theory of international trade, which posits that a demand-driven decline in domestic sales generates excess capacity that can be redirected abroad. The mechanism assumes fixed investment in the short term, which is particularly relevant in China, where investment is often guided by central planning. To expand abroad, firms must gain competitiveness in foreign markets. They typically do so by reducing short-run marginal costs and prices, or by accepting narrower profit margins, and in some cases even losses.

Archived version

Here is s brief summary by a news agency: Chinese goods dumping started before tariffs, ECB study finds

Weak domestic demand appears to be the missing link in explaining China’s strong exports to Europe – more so than tariff-related trade diversion, according to an analysis by the European Central Bank (ECB).

Escalating trade tensions between the United States and China might result in a further diversion of Chinese exports to Europe. However, the rise in China’s exports to the EU predates the latest tensions and coincides instead with the onset of weakness in domestic demand in China, the ECB says.

In the fourth quarter of 2024 the average monthly value of domestic sales was around four times higher than total exports and over 28 times larger than exports to the United States. This suggests the pool of goods that could be redirected to the EU is much broader than trade data alone would suggest. Redirecting even a small share of domestic sales abroad could boost overall exports – including to the EU – more than a sizeable diversion of exports from the United States.

The ECB argues that the start of rising exports and slowing imports dates back to 2021, when China's crisis in its domestic real estate market - typically an import-sensitive sector - sharply curtailed household demand.

At the same time, state-imposed manufacturing investment created overcapacity in industries that would otherwise face market-driven constraints, which eventually resulted in fierce price wars in Chinese home markets forcing companies to seek relief in exports.

The ECB writes:

This has eroded profit margins and discouraged spending in a deflationary environment with significant labour slack – prompting firms to redirect sales toward foreign markets.This shift reflects the “vent-for-surplus” theory of international trade, which posits that a demand-driven decline in domestic sales generates excess capacity that can be redirected abroad. The mechanism assumes fixed investment in the short term, which is particularly relevant in China, where investment is often guided by central planning. To expand abroad, firms must gain competitiveness in foreign markets. They typically do so by reducing short-run marginal costs and prices, or by accepting narrower profit margins, and in some cases even losses.

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/41530810

Migrants in Europe stand by the basic values of democracy, according to a new study by the University of Mannheim in Germany.

“Our results show: immigrants support the core democratic principles to a similarly high degree as people without a migratory background,” says Professor Marc Helbling, sociologist at the University of Mannheim focusing on Migration and Integration and Executive Board member of the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES).

You find the download link for the study here: Liberal democratic values among immigrants in Europe: Socialisation and adaptation processes

Helbling and his team analyzed data from the European Social Survey (ESS) and the SVR’s [Expert Council on Integration and Migration's] German Integration Barometer.

High support for democratic basic values all over Europe

The results of the study show that both migrants from democratic countries of origin and those from authoritarian countries are highly supportive of core democratic norms, such as free elections, equal rights, minority protection, and independent courts. On the ESS scale from 0 to 10, the mean level of support for these values throughout Europe is at 8.56 for migrants. For non-migrants, the level of support is at 8.48. For Germany in particular, the Integration Barometer data with a scale from 0 to 3 show very similar values, more specifically 2.67 and 2.66. “These, in all cases, very high mean values hardly differ between the individual groups of people,” Helbling explains.

Experience with democracy in country of origin has a positive effect

The research team found a small but statistically significant difference between immigrants from highly authoritarian countries, such as Eritrea, Saudi Arabia, or Iran, on the one hand and migrants from more democratic countries, such as India, Turkey, or Romania, on the other. “People who have lived in a very authoritarian system for many years tend to develop slightly weaker democratic attitudes. Conversely, people who have lived in more democratic countries for a long time show a bit more support for democracy. However, the difference is really small,” Helbling explains. “In principle, democratic basic beliefs are shared across cultural and national borders and, as a rule, solidified with increasing democratic life experience,” the social scientist sums up.

Problematic minorities within all groups

Despite the overall high level of support for democracy, there is a small minority among immigrants who reject it. According to the researchers, the share of this group accounts for a medium single-digit percentage. This value is almost exactly the same as the one for people without a migratory background, Helbling emphasizes: “Our analyses show that anti-democratic attitudes are not specifically a migration-related phenomenon. There are critical minorities within all population groups.”

...

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/41530810

Migrants in Europe stand by the basic values of democracy, according to a new study by the University of Mannheim in Germany.

“Our results show: immigrants support the core democratic principles to a similarly high degree as people without a migratory background,” says Professor Marc Helbling, sociologist at the University of Mannheim focusing on Migration and Integration and Executive Board member of the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES).

You find the download link for the study here: Liberal democratic values among immigrants in Europe: Socialisation and adaptation processes

Helbling and his team analyzed data from the European Social Survey (ESS) and the SVR’s [Expert Council on Integration and Migration's] German Integration Barometer.

High support for democratic basic values all over Europe

The results of the study show that both migrants from democratic countries of origin and those from authoritarian countries are highly supportive of core democratic norms, such as free elections, equal rights, minority protection, and independent courts. On the ESS scale from 0 to 10, the mean level of support for these values throughout Europe is at 8.56 for migrants. For non-migrants, the level of support is at 8.48. For Germany in particular, the Integration Barometer data with a scale from 0 to 3 show very similar values, more specifically 2.67 and 2.66. “These, in all cases, very high mean values hardly differ between the individual groups of people,” Helbling explains.

Experience with democracy in country of origin has a positive effect

The research team found a small but statistically significant difference between immigrants from highly authoritarian countries, such as Eritrea, Saudi Arabia, or Iran, on the one hand and migrants from more democratic countries, such as India, Turkey, or Romania, on the other. “People who have lived in a very authoritarian system for many years tend to develop slightly weaker democratic attitudes. Conversely, people who have lived in more democratic countries for a long time show a bit more support for democracy. However, the difference is really small,” Helbling explains. “In principle, democratic basic beliefs are shared across cultural and national borders and, as a rule, solidified with increasing democratic life experience,” the social scientist sums up.

Problematic minorities within all groups

Despite the overall high level of support for democracy, there is a small minority among immigrants who reject it. According to the researchers, the share of this group accounts for a medium single-digit percentage. This value is almost exactly the same as the one for people without a migratory background, Helbling emphasizes: “Our analyses show that anti-democratic attitudes are not specifically a migration-related phenomenon. There are critical minorities within all population groups.”

...

Migrants in Europe stand by the basic values of democracy, according to a new study by the University of Mannheim in Germany.

“Our results show: immigrants support the core democratic principles to a similarly high degree as people without a migratory background,” says Professor Marc Helbling, sociologist at the University of Mannheim focusing on Migration and Integration and Executive Board member of the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES).

You find the download link for the study here: Liberal democratic values among immigrants in Europe: Socialisation and adaptation processes

Helbling and his team analyzed data from the European Social Survey (ESS) and the SVR’s [Expert Council on Integration and Migration's] German Integration Barometer.

High support for democratic basic values all over Europe

The results of the study show that both migrants from democratic countries of origin and those from authoritarian countries are highly supportive of core democratic norms, such as free elections, equal rights, minority protection, and independent courts. On the ESS scale from 0 to 10, the mean level of support for these values throughout Europe is at 8.56 for migrants. For non-migrants, the level of support is at 8.48. For Germany in particular, the Integration Barometer data with a scale from 0 to 3 show very similar values, more specifically 2.67 and 2.66. “These, in all cases, very high mean values hardly differ between the individual groups of people,” Helbling explains.

Experience with democracy in country of origin has a positive effect

The research team found a small but statistically significant difference between immigrants from highly authoritarian countries, such as Eritrea, Saudi Arabia, or Iran, on the one hand and migrants from more democratic countries, such as India, Turkey, or Romania, on the other. “People who have lived in a very authoritarian system for many years tend to develop slightly weaker democratic attitudes. Conversely, people who have lived in more democratic countries for a long time show a bit more support for democracy. However, the difference is really small,” Helbling explains. “In principle, democratic basic beliefs are shared across cultural and national borders and, as a rule, solidified with increasing democratic life experience,” the social scientist sums up.

Problematic minorities within all groups

Despite the overall high level of support for democracy, there is a small minority among immigrants who reject it. According to the researchers, the share of this group accounts for a medium single-digit percentage. This value is almost exactly the same as the one for people without a migratory background, Helbling emphasizes: “Our analyses show that anti-democratic attitudes are not specifically a migration-related phenomenon. There are critical minorities within all population groups.”

...

Archived version

...

40% [of the investigated publications] were found to contain images with something wrong with them, as they describe in the latest edition of biology journal PLoS Biology. The erroneous images even appeared in top journals like Stroke.

...

Some of the problematic cases they discovered involved malicious intent, [the researchers] believe. The scale of the problems is too great for any other explanation, they also write in their article. [One researcher]: ‘Some authors had dozens of publications to their name with erroneous images.’ Wever adds: ‘Images that appeared multiple times were sometimes rotated, mirrored or otherwise edited.’ In other words, there is no way that happened by accident. Meanwhile, these issues being brought to light only led to a warning label (an expression of concern) or withdrawal of the article in one tenth of cases.

...

The findings of the Radboudumc researchers are not unique. The number of scientific articles that turn out to be partially or entirely fabricated is growing. This is partly because companies in countries such as Iran and China use this as a commercial model, the so-called paper mills. They write articles to order or sell authorships, for example via Telegram.

It is unclear whether the 243 problematic studies from the Nijmegen analysis are also products of paper mills. However, it is striking that five sixths of them came from China. Aquarius and Wever did not come across any problematic Dutch publications. One possible explanation put forward by the Nijmegen researchers in their PLoS article is that in China, researchers are under pressure to increase their research output to move up in international university rankings. And in a survey among hospital researchers in south-west China last year half indicated that they sometimes falsified research data.

'The first question you should ask about a publication is whether the study actually took place,' the researchers say.

...

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/40780164

Here is the study: HOW CHINA COLLATERALIZES (pdf)

The How China Collateralizes (HCC) report ... is the first comprehensive analysis of the secured lending practices of Chinese creditors in emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs). The investigation draws upon in-depth case studies and a new dataset of collateralized public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) loans from Chinese state-owned institutions to EMDEs. In total, the dataset captures 620 collateralized PPG debt transactions worth $418 billion in constant 2021 USD over a 22-year period. The report and the dataset are available for download.

Today, in conjunction with the release of How China Collateralizes, AidData has published a large cache of debt contracts—including loan, escrow account, mortgage, and debt restructuring agreements—between Chinese creditors and their overseas borrowers. In total, it has published 371 contracts between 19 Chinese creditors and 155 borrowers from 60 countries in an online repository. Digitized copies of the contracts can be accessed and searched by lender, borrower, sector, and contract clause at http://china-contracts.aiddata.org/.

...

It took the team of researchers nearly four years to make sense of the opaque and complex borrowing arrangements that are documented in the report. The obstacles that they faced were formidable. Despite recent advances in debt data sharing, few bilateral or commercial creditors publish their secured lending terms. Many seek confidentiality commitments from their borrowers, impeding disclosure. Chinese creditors are no exception. They do not publish detailed or comprehensive data about their collateralized PPG loan agreements with EMDE borrowers. Their security and escrow account agreements are even harder to obtain. Quasi-collateral structures present an additional challenge: revenue routing and restricted accounts are substantially easier to shield from public scrutiny than liens over physical assets. The same structures can also undermine fiscal autonomy, debt and revenue accountability, and macroeconomic surveillance.

...

The authors of the report made a number of unexpected findings.

“We were surprised to find that almost half of China’s PPG lending portfolio, or nearly $420 billion across 57 countries, is effectively collateralized—mostly with deposits in bank accounts abroad,” said Christoph Trebesch of the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. “As security, Chinese lenders strongly prefer liquid assets—in particular, cash deposits in bank accounts located in China. They also want visibility and control over revenue streams.”

...

Foreign currency revenues deposited in bank accounts controlled by Chinese lenders secure approximately 80% of the collateralized lending volume in the new dataset. A typical security package supporting a Chinese PPG loan includes one or more restricted (escrow) accounts at banks located in China, funded by revenues from the borrowing country, bolstered by contract and property rights in the cash flows. In many cases, the deposit account is at the creditor bank, which gives them a high level of control over some of the borrower’s core revenue streams, as well as set-off rights under Chinese law.

...

The research team also found that collateral is often unrelated to the stated purpose of the loan. “We see Chinese lenders expanding and adapting standard market tools to make exceptionally risky loans safer,” said Anna Gelpern, a Georgetown Law Professor and Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. “Instead of relying on infrastructure project assets and future revenues, which may never materialize, they seek access to established export proceeds. Exporters commit to route these proceeds through offshore bank accounts over the life of the loan, which gives creditors leverage in the relationship as well as a source of repayment.” The report notes that the World Bank and the IMF have recently raised concerns about “collateralization involving unrelated assets or revenues” and warned that it is “likely to create problems.”

...

According to the authors, commodity revenue sources vary by borrowing country, but typically draw on that country’s leading commodity export: oil in Angola, Iraq, Russia, Sudan, South Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, the Republic of the Congo, Brazil, and Venezuela; gas in Indonesia, Myanmar, and Turkmenistan; gold in Kazakhstan; copper and cobalt in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; bauxite in Guinea; platinum and tobacco in Zimbabwe; cocoa in Ghana; and sesame in Ethiopia. Oil proceeds dominate, accounting for 79% of the commodity-backed lending volume in the dataset.

“Our research reveals a previously undocumented pattern of revenue ring-fencing, where a significant share of commodity export receipts never reaches the exporting countries,” said Brad Parks, Executive Director of William & Mary’s AidData research lab. “When the revenues from a country’s principal source of foreign currency secure its debts to a single creditor, unsecured creditors are effectively subordinated and the risk of a destructive collateral ‘arms race’ increases.”

...

The new study also reveals previously unknown details about collateralization mechanisms in China’s PPG lending portfolio in the developing world. Chinese creditors are far more likely to obtain de facto control over revenue streams and cash holdings (“quasi-collateral”) than formal security interests (liens, pledges, charges, or assignments) in the assets. Quasi-collateral can have the same economic effect as a formal security interest, but it comes with few or no public notice requirements for debtors or creditors.

Over time, the sums that accumulate in offshore accounts to secure public infrastructure debts can be very large, up to billions of US dollars. Political oversight institutions in borrowing countries—such as supreme audit institutions and public accounts committees within parliamentary bodies—have found it difficult to monitor encumbered revenue streams and cash holdings in China.

The implications for EMDEs are far-reaching. “These transactions put those tasked with fiscal governance and debt crisis management in borrower countries in difficult situations,” said Paulina Kintzinger of the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. “Secrecy makes it more difficult to untangle creditor claims in times of distress and default, and can undermine both fiscal autonomy and macroeconomic surveillance.”

...

Chinese lenders also use cash collateral pools that simultaneously secure multiple debts, creating a web of interconnected transactions and risk transmission pathways. A default on any one of these debts can trigger creditor enforcement against the shared collateral, irrespective of the payment status of other obligations, and reverberate across the government’s debt stock and beyond.

For nearly half of China’s collateralized PPG loans in EMDEs, the same asset or pool of assets secures more than one loan. The transaction structure fuses elements of pre-export finance, traditionally used to support commodity exporters, with public infrastructure finance. In the combined structure a pool of established export revenues serves as collateral to de-risk multiple unrelated domestic projects in developing countries.

According to Omar Haddad of Oxford University, “China Eximbank developed a replicable and scalable cross-collateralization structure in Angola. That model was subsequently refined and adapted by a diverse group of Chinese creditors in a wide array of PPG lending operations in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Central Asia.”

...

Here is the study: HOW CHINA COLLATERALIZES (pdf)

The How China Collateralizes (HCC) report ... is the first comprehensive analysis of the secured lending practices of Chinese creditors in emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs). The investigation draws upon in-depth case studies and a new dataset of collateralized public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) loans from Chinese state-owned institutions to EMDEs. In total, the dataset captures 620 collateralized PPG debt transactions worth $418 billion in constant 2021 USD over a 22-year period. The report and the dataset are available for download.

Today, in conjunction with the release of How China Collateralizes, AidData has published a large cache of debt contracts—including loan, escrow account, mortgage, and debt restructuring agreements—between Chinese creditors and their overseas borrowers. In total, it has published 371 contracts between 19 Chinese creditors and 155 borrowers from 60 countries in an online repository. Digitized copies of the contracts can be accessed and searched by lender, borrower, sector, and contract clause at http://china-contracts.aiddata.org/.

...

It took the team of researchers nearly four years to make sense of the opaque and complex borrowing arrangements that are documented in the report. The obstacles that they faced were formidable. Despite recent advances in debt data sharing, few bilateral or commercial creditors publish their secured lending terms. Many seek confidentiality commitments from their borrowers, impeding disclosure. Chinese creditors are no exception. They do not publish detailed or comprehensive data about their collateralized PPG loan agreements with EMDE borrowers. Their security and escrow account agreements are even harder to obtain. Quasi-collateral structures present an additional challenge: revenue routing and restricted accounts are substantially easier to shield from public scrutiny than liens over physical assets. The same structures can also undermine fiscal autonomy, debt and revenue accountability, and macroeconomic surveillance.

...

The authors of the report made a number of unexpected findings.

“We were surprised to find that almost half of China’s PPG lending portfolio, or nearly $420 billion across 57 countries, is effectively collateralized—mostly with deposits in bank accounts abroad,” said Christoph Trebesch of the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. “As security, Chinese lenders strongly prefer liquid assets—in particular, cash deposits in bank accounts located in China. They also want visibility and control over revenue streams.”

...

Foreign currency revenues deposited in bank accounts controlled by Chinese lenders secure approximately 80% of the collateralized lending volume in the new dataset. A typical security package supporting a Chinese PPG loan includes one or more restricted (escrow) accounts at banks located in China, funded by revenues from the borrowing country, bolstered by contract and property rights in the cash flows. In many cases, the deposit account is at the creditor bank, which gives them a high level of control over some of the borrower’s core revenue streams, as well as set-off rights under Chinese law.

...

The research team also found that collateral is often unrelated to the stated purpose of the loan. “We see Chinese lenders expanding and adapting standard market tools to make exceptionally risky loans safer,” said Anna Gelpern, a Georgetown Law Professor and Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. “Instead of relying on infrastructure project assets and future revenues, which may never materialize, they seek access to established export proceeds. Exporters commit to route these proceeds through offshore bank accounts over the life of the loan, which gives creditors leverage in the relationship as well as a source of repayment.” The report notes that the World Bank and the IMF have recently raised concerns about “collateralization involving unrelated assets or revenues” and warned that it is “likely to create problems.”

...

According to the authors, commodity revenue sources vary by borrowing country, but typically draw on that country’s leading commodity export: oil in Angola, Iraq, Russia, Sudan, South Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, the Republic of the Congo, Brazil, and Venezuela; gas in Indonesia, Myanmar, and Turkmenistan; gold in Kazakhstan; copper and cobalt in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; bauxite in Guinea; platinum and tobacco in Zimbabwe; cocoa in Ghana; and sesame in Ethiopia. Oil proceeds dominate, accounting for 79% of the commodity-backed lending volume in the dataset.

“Our research reveals a previously undocumented pattern of revenue ring-fencing, where a significant share of commodity export receipts never reaches the exporting countries,” said Brad Parks, Executive Director of William & Mary’s AidData research lab. “When the revenues from a country’s principal source of foreign currency secure its debts to a single creditor, unsecured creditors are effectively subordinated and the risk of a destructive collateral ‘arms race’ increases.”

...

The new study also reveals previously unknown details about collateralization mechanisms in China’s PPG lending portfolio in the developing world. Chinese creditors are far more likely to obtain de facto control over revenue streams and cash holdings (“quasi-collateral”) than formal security interests (liens, pledges, charges, or assignments) in the assets. Quasi-collateral can have the same economic effect as a formal security interest, but it comes with few or no public notice requirements for debtors or creditors.

Over time, the sums that accumulate in offshore accounts to secure public infrastructure debts can be very large, up to billions of US dollars. Political oversight institutions in borrowing countries—such as supreme audit institutions and public accounts committees within parliamentary bodies—have found it difficult to monitor encumbered revenue streams and cash holdings in China.

The implications for EMDEs are far-reaching. “These transactions put those tasked with fiscal governance and debt crisis management in borrower countries in difficult situations,” said Paulina Kintzinger of the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. “Secrecy makes it more difficult to untangle creditor claims in times of distress and default, and can undermine both fiscal autonomy and macroeconomic surveillance.”

...

Chinese lenders also use cash collateral pools that simultaneously secure multiple debts, creating a web of interconnected transactions and risk transmission pathways. A default on any one of these debts can trigger creditor enforcement against the shared collateral, irrespective of the payment status of other obligations, and reverberate across the government’s debt stock and beyond.

For nearly half of China’s collateralized PPG loans in EMDEs, the same asset or pool of assets secures more than one loan. The transaction structure fuses elements of pre-export finance, traditionally used to support commodity exporters, with public infrastructure finance. In the combined structure a pool of established export revenues serves as collateral to de-risk multiple unrelated domestic projects in developing countries.

According to Omar Haddad of Oxford University, “China Eximbank developed a replicable and scalable cross-collateralization structure in Angola. That model was subsequently refined and adapted by a diverse group of Chinese creditors in a wide array of PPG lending operations in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Central Asia.”

...