TLDR: New speed cameras in Slovakia contained an undocumented module that allowed them to be controlled remotely and granted full access to them via mobile network. All it took to activate it was to send a text message from one of 12 Russian numbers.

Further context:

Cameras purchased by Slovakia's Interior Ministry for road surveillance have been traced to a Cypriot shell company [Sodasus Ltd] with no business history, with the only identifiable trail leading back to Russia, raising serious security concerns about the procurement.

Article translation:

The cameras installed by the Ministry of the Interior along Slovakia’s roads were, in fact, entirely Russian-made. They even contained 12 Russian telephone numbers that could be used to hack directly into the cameras and view the footage.

This was highlighted by the opposition movement Progressive Slovakia, which claims that Interior Minister Matúš Šutaj Eštok was misleading the public when he claimed at a press conference last week that only certain parts of the speed cameras were Russian. Progressive Slovakia cites an assessment by the National Security Authority, which the movement obtained via a freedom of information request.

A backdoor for foreign espionage

On Friday, the National Security Authority issued its own assessment of the radars. Based on this assessment, Peter Bátor, a security expert with the movement, described the mechanism by which, in his view, it was possible to access data from the radars under test. According to him, all it took was to send a message to one of the pre-set telephone numbers, enter a password, and the attacker gained full access to the camera. This is because the devices contained a module that is not documented anywhere; it was retrofitted into the device and is hard-coded in such a way that it cannot be removed or altered.

“This is a very specific example of how Russia uses the technology it sells for espionage,” said Bátor, adding that twelve Russian telephone numbers were linked to this undocumented module. Any one of them was sufficient for an unauthorised operator to gain full control of the camera. Furthermore, the device also had built-in administrator access with a precisely defined password. According to the findings, it was therefore possible to control the camera not only via a standard 3G or 4G port, but there were many more connection options available.

All credits to Tatarigami_UA. I thought it was a good read, but most would miss it seen where it was originally posted-

The removal of Yabloko, Russia’s only openly anti-war party among those registered for the elections, on August 10 may not have surprised many. Yet the underlying conditions that led to this decision warrant much closer examination, as they loudly point at growing anxieties within the Kremlin over public sentiment and political control

The first point is electoral. With Yabloko as the only registered party openly opposing the war, anti-war and oppositional voters had a clear political vehicle around which to concentrate their votes. Removing the party therefore does more than eliminate one competitor. It removes one of the few legal mechanisms through which the scale of anti-war sentiment could become visible.

This raises an important question: why would the Kremlin consider such a marginal party dangerous enough to exclude? One possible explanation is that anti-war sentiment has grown to a level where allowing it to be measured electorally creates an unnecessary political risk. Even if Yabloko had little chance of challenging the government directly, a significant protest vote could expose a widening gap between the official narrative of national unity and the actual mood within parts of Russian society.

The decision also points to a broader loss of confidence inside the political system. For years, parties associated with the “systemic opposition” were tolerated because they operated within boundaries set by the Kremlin and posed little threat to the existing order. If even an already registered party can now be removed because of its anti-war position, those boundaries appear to be narrowing further.

That makes the decision more than an administrative measure, it shows that a political system consolidating further around the war against Ukraine and reducing the space for any peaceful alternative within formal politics.

The contrast with the Kremlin’s messaging to Western audiences is particularly visible now - Moscow continues to present Russia as a country interested in peace and negotiations, while blaming Ukraine for prolonging the war. Yet domestically, the only openly anti-war electoral option is being removed. This creates a simple but important question for those who accept the Kremlin’s diplomatic narrative: if Russia is genuinely seeking peace, why is it eliminating the only legal anti-war party from the ballot?

There is also a broader question of electoral legitimacy: in the past, Russia at least tried to preserve the appearance of controlled opposition to maintain the facade of pseudo-democratic, sham elections. Now, if even systemic opposition parties are simply removed from the ballot and voters are denied any meaningful alternative, the elections lose even their nominal legitimacy

Recommended policy response:

• The removal of Yabloko should provide grounds for Western governments to deny the legitimacy of Russia’s elections and refuse to recognize their results.

• The European Commission and EU spokespersons condemned the move as “removing the last dissenting voices.” This should also be seen as an opportunity to increase sanctions pressure on Russia, including against individuals involved in organizing sham elections in the occupied territories, excluding opposition parties from elections, or taking other actions that help the Kremlin suppress anti-war voices

• Any “elections” held in the occupied territories of Ukraine are illegitimate as well, not only because they are conducted under occupation and at gunpoint, but because Russia itself no longer holds elections that can be considered legitimate. Europe and the G7 should recognize this reality and continue to refuse recognition of any such results going forward.

• The destruction of the pro-peace opposition signals that the Kremlin is preparing not for genuine negotiations, but for a prolonged war and possible escalation. By eliminating advocates of compromise, it is consolidating domestic politics around the war effort. This strengthens the case for greater Western military support to Ukraine, denying Moscow gains through force and increasing pressure for serious negotiations.