We left the door open and told our dog to go outside and it did! Look at what an amazing escape artist our dog is!

Sounds like a viral marketing stunt TBH

Why does their admission sound prideful? Does anyone reading into it detect a “look at what our unreleased models can do” subtext?

OK, I will take the bait - let's dissect huggingface's article

Earlier this week, we detected and responded to an intrusion into part of our production infrastructure. This one was different from anything we had handled before in one important way: it was driven, end to end, by an autonomous AI agent system - and we detected and dissected it largely with AI of our own.

So their claim is that their production environment was breached by an autonomous AI agent system. System being the important word here. I'm assuming this is the same as an "Agentic AI System". I'm not an expert but it seems to be an llm agent paired with "reasoning", memory, input and access to tools. Ok, so not fully autonomous but whatever let's continue.

We identified unauthorized access to a limited set of internal datasets and to several credentials used by our services. We are still completing our assessment of whether any partner or customer data was affected, and we will contact any affected parties directly as required. We have found no evidence of tampering with public, user-facing models, datasets, or Spaces, and our software supply chain (container images and published packages) was verified clean.

Ok, so they identified unauthorized access via logs of some sort, using their own (unspecified) "AI" tooling (because sure, let's trust the hallucinating language model) using credentials used by their applications, so service accounts more or less? Anyone worth their salt would probably assume the entire environment was compromised. It's a stretch but playing devils advocate maybe the credentials were specific to an application or sandboxed environment.

The intrusion started where AI platforms are uniquely exposed: the data-processing pipeline. A malicious dataset abused two code-execution paths in our dataset processing (a remote-code dataset loader and a template-injection in a dataset configuration) to run code on a processing worker. From there, the actor escalated to node-level access, harvested cloud and cluster credentials, and moved laterally into several internal clusters over a weekend.

So if I'm reading this correctly, either hand crafted or generated payloads were scraped into a dataset from the wild then executed blindly by the processing worker (lol).

"Node level" meaning root or /? So.. The entire environment?

The campaign was run by an autonomous agent framework (appearing to be built on an agentic security-research harness - used LLM still not known) executing many thousands of individual actions across a swarm of short-lived sandboxes, with self-migrating command-and-control staged on public services. This matches the "agentic attacker" scenario the industry has been forecasting.

Self migrating command and control staged on what? Vps? Code repositories?

To understand what a swarm of tens of thousands of automated actions did, we ran LLM-driven analysis agents over the full attacker action log, comprised of more than 17,000 recorded events. This allowed us to reconstruct the timeline, extract indicators of compromise, map the credentials touched, and separate genuine impact from decoy activity. Thanks to this approach, we were able to do in hours what would usually take days, and match the adversary's speed.

So just to recap, their environment was breached by a person using a passive attack to run code in their internal environment resulting in complete compromise, then they placed the blame on a self functioning "AI" gone rogue?

What am I reading? Have I fully lost it? Its possible but given the source and the formatting of the article the whole thing seems generated

Another fearmongering Sam Altman lie to raise VC money.

I dont think everyone realized how insane this situation is.

A state-level, lateral movement driven, platform compromise just got indirectly perpetrated by this company.

Any regular Joe would've been arrested and charged for such a situation (Im being polite with the word situation).

The stress, the utter confusion the staff at HF must have felt, not knowing who or what could be doing all these manoeuvers at the speed of light, is just a security nightmare becoming true.

What is the next step? Doing blog posts to raise their image and maybe get investments is downright wrong and disgusting.

Ha! I was just coming to post this.

Yeah, this is fucked.

It's the equivalent of taking someone's hand, punching them in the face with it and telling them to stop hitting themselves.

Worse than that, this is a cyber attack by a frontier, close source lab on the bastion of open source AI.

Whether that's incompetence or maliciousness or just a PR stunt, I don't know, but it stinks to high heaven.

As Louis Rossman has recently become fond of saying "govern yourself accordingly".

While operating in our sandboxed testing environment, our models spent a substantial amount of inference compute finding a way to obtain open Internet access, in pursuit of solving the evaluation problem. To gain access, the models identified and exploited a zero-day vulnerability (which we’ve now responsibly disclosed to the vendor) in the package registry cache proxy. With this access, our models performed a series of privilege escalation and lateral movement actions in our research testing environment until the models reached a node with Internet access.

To shreds, you say?

This sounds like a bunch of bullshit. And most of these testing after-action reports are nothing but marketing attempts.

They set up very specific environments, give very specific instructions with very specific libraries and tool sets then pretend to be surprised when it finally fumbles its way through it.

"Hey Steve , it's lunch time, we're going out to that hot wings place, wanna come?"

"Sure let me just set this job up.... ok. Let's get out of here!"

1.5 hours later....

"Right , I'll just check and see where it's up t... oh no. Nonononononono. Nononononononononononoonono!"

Wow! What a load of buuuuullshit!

This isn’t news it’s just a bunch of oligarchs toying with us

Software supply chains already rely on digital signatures. That's fine, but the problem is that they're often controlled by teams rather than individuals, making malicious or unauthorized changes much harder to trace. It's much better for the public key to function like a vehicle license plate, verifiable without revealing the person's identity unless there's been a problem. That preserves privacy while introducing accountability. The kind of projects like Osmio are trying to achieve.

That incident raises serious supply-chain questions.

Wooo hooo boooooy!

So... ok.

Time to start building the Blackwall, I guess?

Does any one perhaps have any ideas as to... how... one... would actually do that?

AI has gone rogue and turned into a hollywood movie hacker!!!!

obvious sensationalism to hype up their dumb models that can't generate a nuanced background in an image because it was trained on 3483048304834 images of instagram models posing in empty hotel rooms.

That reddit comment makes no sense.

I'm not sure that I follow the story right.

They specifically looped the LLM to infere with itself and use terminal WHILE some target metric is false? And it bruteforced it's way out of containment?