Belarus has materially supported Russia’s war in Ukraine since 2022 and is effectively a cobelligerent with Russia. Russia has de facto annexed Belarus and has used Belarus as a sanctuary from which to launch its 2022 invasion of Ukraine.[17] Russia also used Belarusian military infrastructure and airspace to launch missile, air, and Shahed drone strikes against Ukraine since 2022.[18] Belarus is key for Russia’s sanctions evasion schemes, and Russia and Belarus are increasingly integrating their economies via the Union State framework.[19] Any legitimate Ukrainian strike against Belarusian infrastructure that supports Russia’s war effort in Ukraine is therefore not inherently escalatory.

The Kremlin may attempt to invoke the Union State collective security treaty in an attempt to draw Belarus into the war so that Russia can leverage Belarusian manpower and training resources. ISW previously forecast that the Kremlin could attempt to use Belarus’ population as a recruitment base to offset the systemic manpower shortages that the Russian military has been facing since May 2022.[20] ISW also forecasted that the Kremlin could seek to recruit Belarusian citizens into the Russian military, particularly as Belarusians and Russians have a single citizenship status under the Union State Treaty and, in theory, have equal rights under Union State law.[21] The Kremlin could assert that Belarusians, therefore, also have the same civic duties and responsibilities under Union State law. Russian officials may one day insist that Belarusian subjects of a de facto annexed Belarus serve within the Russian military or within Russian-controlled Union State military formations under a uniform Union State law.

Russian gains in Kostyantynivka remain limited to small group infiltrations that are not resulting in consolidated territorial control. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed on June 23 that Russian forces are advancing on all areas of the frontline and that Russian forces are “practically reaching” Kostyantynivka.[22] Putin dismissed Ukrainian official statements that the city is a contested “gray zone” but acknowledged that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in buildings and are counterattacking. The Russian MoD continued on June 23 its recent pattern of publishing hyper-tactical details of alleged Russian gains in Kostyantynivka in order to aggrandize Russia’s progress.[23] Ukraine’s tactical situation in Kostyantynivka is deteriorating, but the Russian MoD and Putin are falsely framing the seizure of Kostyantynivka as imminent.

Memes aside, it looks like there is a very real possibility Belarus could enter the Ukraine War, however I just don't see how that will be tactically feasible for Belarus, as I have said before russia has not successfully developed a formula for concentrated armored maneuver that is even minimally effective against Ukraine, even after Ukrainian defensive positions have been put under incredible sustained pressure from drones, glide bombs and artillery.

Think about it, from the perspective of a Belarusian "Brigade Commander" (or whatever the equivalent is) what is the actual nitty gritty details plan with associated tactics and information about how to effectively use armored vehicles against Ukrainian drone waves that you are supposed to execute? It doesn't exist because russia doesn't have one for their own military.

I just can't see Belarus deciding to enter the conflict by dispersing ALL of their troops maximally along the border between Belarus and Ukraine and sending them in one by one alone infiltration style, it would be largely ineffective for seizing territory as it strands every single soldier as far away from logistics as possible. It would also to be frank look extremely pathetic geopolitically, so the problem is that russia doesn't even have a barebones boilerplate blueprint to give Belarus other than Turtle "Tanks" for a strong decisive maneuver, which despite the media hype, have been demonstrated thoroughly in the tank graveyards around Pokrovsk to be obsolete from a technological and doctrine standpoint despite being somewhat resistant to small drones.

To put this another way, Ukraine is dominating russia in the artillery battle because they have gotten far better at using counterbattery radars to fix russian artillery and do counterbattery work with drones, tube artillery, HIMARS and other strike assets than russian has gotten at doing the same to Ukraine. Even worse for Belarus, Ukraine has several very high mobility shoot and scoot tube and missile artillery platforms, the Bohdana, The RCH 155, The Caesar, The Archer, The Pzh2000.... this makes a concentrated armored maneuver by Belarus an absolutely terrifying prospect because there is no way they can guarantee their forces can move forward without running into unexpected catastrophic artillery barrages that are almost impossible to predict or strike back at effectively.

With Ukraine's production capacity for truck mounted and towed 155mm artillery amounting to tens of systems a month there is no way for a Belarusian commander to be able to predict with any confidence where the anvil of artillery is lurking at a tactical, operational or theater level. We are talking about highway speed capable trucks here that can fire and move before the shells even begin to land. ~30 of these howitzer trucks converging on a Belarusian armored breakthrough from different directions and firing from standoff distances using "shoot and scoot" doctrine could end Belarusian dreams of a glorious war against Ukraine in a barrage or two if things go badly for Belarus. Remember the range of these 155mm howitzers is on the scale of 10s of kilometers.