Is Signal messaging really private?
As Signal get your phone number. Can we considerate this application as private ? What's your thoughts about it ? I'm also using SimpleX, ElementX, Threema, but not much people using it...
Cheers
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This is kind of useless fear-mongering suited to no one's threat model.
Are messages truly E2EE and they don't share meta data? Yes? Then you're fine. It needs a phone number for registration? OK, well buy a burner SIM card (you of course have several, right?) to register it if you're that worried. Because if you're already at a level where you're THAT concerned about your phone number pinging for using a widely popular messaging app, then you have lost the game by even having a phone or sending messages to other humans who are the weakest link in the security chain anyway.
Considering that the Feds tried to make some government-compliant front end for Signal for idiot Hegseth to use to talk about national security stuff with the Vice President, I'd say that it's probably fine for you to buy weed or whatever.
I'll add that if someone knowing your phone number is an actual threat to your safety, you should already know better about using something more anonymous.
Privacy ≠ anonymity
Illegal in many countries. SIM cards are attached to your real world identity.
And we shouldn't depend on such archaic highly centralized technology like phone numbers from techinical perspective either, it is only like this because it is deeply entrenched and a very easily a suprisingly reliable form of identification and deanomization
Signal has too many red flags, but the biggest one is phone numbers and SIM cards. No application that wants to be secure against nation state spying relies on these.
Private and anonymous are different things. While anonymity does increase privacy, it is not a strict requirement. So it this private, but not as private as possible.
The best private messenger IMO is simplex, but it not production ready yet
Many people say that SimpleX is not ready to replace the likes of Whatsapp, Telegram and Signal yet but noone specifies exactly what features are missing.
I get that public key cryptography is confusing for the average people but there is no UI fix that is getting around that obstacle if we want people to make informed choices on what platform/protocol to use for communications.
The same thing applies to decentralization - people just need to understand that the trade-off they're making for communications' resilience is the comfort of an online addressbook.
Although I admit that there are certain UI elements that could be made better (for example the nickname setting could be stylized a bit better so people can more easily change the names of their contacts to something more familiar), most criticism towards SimpleX comes from people being a bit lazy and not reading the manual before using the app.
TL;DR: I don't understand what features are missing from SimpleX.
Multi-device message syncing. Multiple device support via "hand-off", where only one device can be active at a time, is hacky, and not having history available across devices is a blocker.
The main Dev gave a talk somewhere sometime where he explained why doing multi device is a security risk. I always look for it and always lose the URL without watching it so I can't explain more
Þat sounds like an excuse, especially since þey allow it, just not concurrently, and from þe tickets I've read it's only because of technical issues, not because of some þeory of attack vectors.
I did some quick googling and found this. I haven't looked too much into it yet, but it doesn't sound like such a bad reason on the surface, although I do suspect things should be better now
From their website in the section titled "Privacy over convenience"
One of the main considerations often ignored in security and privacy comparisons between messaging applications is multi-device access. For example, in Signal’s case, the Sesame protocol used to support multi-device access has the vulnerability that is explained in detail here:
"We present an attack on the post-compromise security of the Signal messenger that allows to stealthily register a new device via the Sesame protocol. [...] This new device can send and receive messages without raising any ‘Bad encrypted message’ errors. Our attack thus shows that the Signal messenger does not guarantee post-compromise security at all in the multi-device setting".
Solutions are possible, and even the quoted paper proposes improvements, but they are not implemented in any existing communication solutions. Unfortunately this results in most communication systems, even those in the privacy space, having compromised security in multi-device settings due to these limitations. That's the reason we are not rushing a full multi-device support, and currently only provide the ability to use mobile app profiles via the desktop app, while they are on the same network.
So SimpleX does support multiple devices, but wiþ limitations. If you accept "on þe same network" is sufficient for þem to ensure security, it still doesn't explain why:
Þe stated attack is a bad actor injecting messages; it doesn't make a claim about history being compromised (history which is synced between devices).
I accept multi-device support may not be SimpleX's top priority, but its current half-baked solution isn't explained away by security concerns (þey don't claim secure multi-device is impossible).
Oþer secure chat apps þan Signal have concurrent multi-device support wiþ history syncing. Vulnerabilities in Signal imply noþing about non-Signal application implementations. Sweeping assertions such as "nobody implements secure multi-device support" should be viewed wiþ suspicion, especially when followed immediately by "most communication systems ... having flawed multi-device" implementations. All, or most?
Found a better article
https://simplex.chat/faq/#why-cant-i-use-the-same-profile-on-different-devices
Which other e2ee decentralized apps have multi device without relaxing security?
Offtopic: there seems to be some issue with your comments. Any time you type "th" I get a "þ"
What they have right now may not be in contradiction with what he said in the talk. Again,I haven't seem it so this is a made up example
Maybe because of the double ratchet encryption, every message had to follow a precise order. Of it doesn't, everything breaks. Multi device with handoff is easy since only one can send and science messages. But if you don't have handoff, you have to relax security rules to allow both to work at the same time
Right now when you establish a connection with someone, you exchange between 2 and 4 connections. Each person shares that receive servers out of which one of them is for, and the other is clear net. If you don't have to running and one of the servers goes down, half of the messages no longer deliver. There is no server rotation. Even if you swap your servers ahead of the server shutting down, contacts don't cycle and they are lost
That is currently my biggest reason not to recommend. There are also UX improvements like live messages which I think are useless and will cause people to get confused (they are messages that the other person can see in real time as you type them). They should also include some soft of recommended backup solution because people WILL get mad about losing everything
I often see convos on SimpleX that are clearly missing messages, so I'm not sure what that's about. I mean I see people quoting messages that are not visible.
Also I really think they need to implement UnifiedPush before it's ready. It consumes an excessive amount of battery life for this reason.
Also worth noting that the creator is an alt-right loon of the highest order.
What has he said or done?
You'd have to go and look up his Xitter account.
Holy hell! Didn't imagine him being that far right. Always thought the accusations were half made-up.
It's always sad to see promising FOSS projects taint their image with deplorable political views or behaviour (Hyprland, GNU, GrapheneOS, probably some others). Although I believe in freedom of opinion, I draw the line on inciting violence and hatred against minorities. Also, I can't fathom why he would still use Xitter, when so many better alternatives exist?
If you are curious, here is a link for the roadmap so that you can see the things they are still planing. Some are going to bother normies (like shortening the group URLs will probably mean that they have to update them)
https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#roadmap
stickers
Signal is the gold standard of secure messengers. If you're looking for decentralized go with xmpp and/or matrix.
Hosted in the US on amazon servers, subject to national security letters.
If it was hosted outside the US and not on AWS, would you use it then?
No because I don't think centralized services are a good idea for communications platforms.
US is the gold standard in surveillance and spying. I will not use any cloud services based in the US.
My brother, you clearly haven't read much about the CCP's surveillance efforts.
Also remind me which region is actively attempting to end encryption as a whole?
E: lots of downvotes. No answers.
Right now, for the wider population, it it a heaven sent option compared to Whatsapp, FB messenger etc. Break those bonds first and keep the wheel turning.
Depends on your threat model, as always. If you require absolute anonymity, it's tricky, because it uses phone number during the onboarding process, so get an anonymous pre-paid number and discard it after registration. After onboarding you don't need the number.
For the rest, it's about as "private" as you make it. It supports group messaing, calls and video, so obviously you need to be careful while using it. Everything is e2e encrypted and stays on your local device, the source is available and has been extensively audited. The company itself is non-profit and has sensible privacy policy.
But yeah, your threat model is the key answer to your question
That's not something that exists in many countries. SIM-cards have to be attached to a real world identity by law.
It exists on the internet, so it exists in every country.
Blog post about Threema that changed my mind against it: https://soatok.blog/2021/11/05/threema-three-strikes-youre-out/
Why is this furry-themed?
Why not? Its nice to have fun with your website.
It's a furry blog that happens to write about security a lot, and the author usually has very well-founded takes.
Chill out and enjoy it -- you might learn something new. I usually do :D
owo
Why not?
Oh yeah, same. Great writeup, comprehensive and well written, have it bookmarked in case I need to talk to people about Threema.
Love it thank you for sharing. Awesome blog and so much relevant information. it's now on RSS feed :)
people will still expect you to share phone numbers to talk in signal in my personal experience, I really don't understand how they get so attached to such an archaic technology and often will refuse to use the alias system completely because remembering a random string of numbers is "simpler" somehow
Secure and private or anonymous are very different things and nearly impossible to do both at the same time and still make it user friendly. Signal is secure, not fully private or anonymous.
Why do people think this secure vs private distinction is in any way meaningful. I don't want a US service to have my phone number, or spy on me, and have social network graphs, period.
Why is the US government being able to spy on me considered "secure"?
Because you trade privacy for convenience. You could have a totally private communication platform, but you'd need to trade current IP addresses of your devices if there's no users and no centralized routing server or at least a list of what device is associated what person.
It's secure because people can't read the content of your message. It's not private because people can find you with your phone number or username and associate encrypted message packages with the sender and receiver so they know who you called and when, but not what you said.
So if your contacts are tech savvy enough to call you to get your current unique IPv6 address, something that Android doesn't really support out of the box, and IPv4 often won't work due to layers of routing caused by the world running out of addresses, or some other unique network identifier, and there are no firewalls between you or they've all been configured appropriately to allow the particular message protocol then you could send simple IP Messages to each other.
But as long as you want to use a system that routes messages and has a user database, that central location will always be a privacy hole.
With the phone number, no; and since there's no Signal usage without a phone number, well…. Also, I think somewhere on their website (or some place) they talked about burner phones as if it's a universal phenomena.
Signal has felt "out of place" to me. Odd. It doesn't fit in, doesn't make sense if I think a bit farther about it.
I hope something decentralised comes out of Signal protocol minus the need for a phone number.
SimpleX uses Signal tech AFAIK but without requiring phone number or email address.
You are talking about session. Session is a signal fork, and you don't need phone number. But there is some concerns about its security as, in order to properly work, it removed some signal features, I'm not qualified enough to understand if it's truly a security risk or not. But the option to use it is there.
I used it for a couple years, but came back to signal because I had so many issues with media sharing.
Imo signal protocol is mostly fairly robust, signal service itself is about the best middle ground available to get the general public off bigtech slop.
It compares favorably against whatsapp while providing comparable UX/onboarding/rendevous, which is pretty essential to get your non-tech friends/family out of meta's evil clutches.
Just the sheer number of people signal's helped to protect from eg. meta, you gotta give praise for that.
It is lacking in core features which would bring it to the next level of privacy, anonymity and safety. But it's not exactly trivial to provide ALL of the above in one package while retaining accessibility to the general public.
Personally, I'd be happier if signal began to offer these additional features as options, maybe behind a consent checkbox like "yes i know what i'm doing (if someone asked you to enable this mode & you're only doing it because they told you to, STOP NOW -> ok -> NO REALLY, STOP NOW IF YOU ARE BEING ASKED TO ENABLE THIS BY ANYONE -> ok -> alright, here ya go...)".
They have your phone number but that's really all they have.
Some people say Bozos can read your metadata because it's hosted on AWS servers but I don't believe that.
The face that Signal needs phone numbers to sign up is very bad.
No one that has told me this has ever been able to offer up any sort of explanation, but please do feel free to give it ago.
Multiple-accounts and pseudonyms. It's like the 101 of interacting on the Internet. With a phone number requirement that's automatically made impossible.
Also SIM-cards/phone numbers are required by law to be attached to your real world identity in many countries.
What about them?
Why is that a problem?
Why are you posting as [email protected] and not @?
...because this is not a private message? And because my home address is not a piefed server. Such a weird question...
SS7 hacking can intercept your calls and text messages as well as your location just by knowing your phone number.
https://youtu.be/wVyu7NB7W6Y
I don't understand what that has to do with this conversation. Signal does not advertise your phone number to anyone that doesn't already have it.
Since we are on the topic of signal.. im not tech saviie but i have read lots of blogs and people about how secure is the signal protocol. My question is .. how can i be sure that the protocol is implemented as the open source code shows? Please correct me if im wrong but from what i read on their website the apk they provide has the capability to update itself at anytime. So what stops them to change how it works with an update? is it posible to build the apk yourself and stop the ability to update?
Just like any foss project, there some level of trust if you are going with the main distribution. In theory you are correct that not much is stopping them from releasing a malicious update, but because it is open source, soon enough people would notice that either they released new code that is malicious, or that the new version does not match the source code. That kind of scenario is known as a supply chain attack.
Since the code is open, you can literally read it for yourself to see exactly what the apk does. You can also fork it and modify it however you like, just like the creator of Molly did (Molly is a fork of the Signal client that adds some security features)
It's a centralized, US-based service running on AWS, that's not self-hostable, requires phone numbers, and you have no idea what code their server is running.
Whether the app you use for it is open source, is entirely irrelevant for them building social network graphs, considering they have your real identity via phone numbers.
If the answer is "I just trust them", then you're not doing security correctly.
It is not as good as a decentralized system, and even though the server is open source, it isn't self hostable (technically in an intranet you could but not easily)
But the signal foundation is a non profit with external audits and a proven track record with law enforced requesting data and getting basically nothing (If i remember correctly they only have your user to phone number relation and the last time you were online)
So although it is imperfect, it is an amazing solution that is almost the only 1:1 competitor to whatsapp/messenger/imessage that is privacy respecting, so I am very grateful for it's existence.
What about threema?
Just the fact that it costs means that most people won't even consider it, making it very hard to recommend.
Since its a centralized server that isn't self hostable, you have no idea whats running on their server. Signal even went a whole year once without publishing any server back end code updates, until it raised a lot of hackles so they started adding to it again.
You have no idea what they give to authorities: in fact with NSL's, its illegal for them to tell you. Signal's response to this is "just trust us".
100% this, there is matrix, but that was a pain when I used it (this was a few years ago, granted). Signal just works.
Thanks for the explanation!
the metadata isn't
All the signal fans here should give me your phone number if you think its a secure service. All of them are hosted on AWS btw.
You're equating giving my Mom my phone number with broadcasting my phone number on the Threadiverse?
Signal is a US-based entity subject to warrantless NSLs, with all the data hosted on AWS. Its not giving your phone number to your mom. Its giving your phone number to amazon and most likely a US surveillance government agency.
For a threat model you should assume the worst and never trust any US-domiciled data service or platform.
The government already has every US citizens number anyways.
So just give up and use signal then?
You're not going to convince me to use US-domiciled services.
Then just say you don't like the US, no reason to make up some bullshit about NSLs and AWS and phone numbers.
Do you really think they don't already have my/your phone #?
Since I don't use comms platforms they have jurisdiction over, I lessen the risk.
Lessen the risk of...finding out your phone #?
Give me your threat model so I can laugh. You have no idea of what being secure is. Thank you for being yet another troll.
Simple: I don't use any US-based service due to NSLs
I especially don't use any us-based service that asks for my phone number.
So what client would you recommend? I also feel like if it's offered on Google Play or Apple Store it's sus, but for lower income USians, it looks like Google Play is soon to become the forced option, especially on phones < $100.
Matrix, simpleX. Both have apps on f-droid, are federated, E2EE, and the servers are self-hostable anywhere in the world. Neither require phone numbers or identifiable info.
I'll see if my heavily locked down device will let me download/install the files. Thank you so much!
I don't use Signal to talk to people I know only pseudonymously through the internet. I use it to talk to people with whom I would already share my phone number. That social graph can be ascertained a thousand ways already. I think it is worth pointing out as you do, however. If I wanted to attempt to hide the fact that I was contacting someone from the state, I'm not sure where I would start, but it wouldn't be Signal.
No, and they are supported by US gov (last check), so no good can come of that.
Do you've reference about it ?
Quick googling comes up with only people refuting this claim.
Sure, we had signal gate, but the way that was received should make it pretty clear that it’s not supported for official use.
Not supported for official use because it leaves no trace for the formal record. Not because Signal is insecure.
Even if it is, I don't think we should give the government the power to tell us what to not use. Otherwise they just pick any good projects, throw money at it, leak the data, and people jump to a less secure. Trust the code and nothing more
https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/6829998083994-Phone-Number-Privacy-and-Usernames-Deeper-Dive
https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/issues/8974
I couldn't find any sources regarding this topic
I dislike Signal because they are many google play services, and do not try to distribute their app beyond Google Play Store.
https://signal.org/android/apk/
and if you want, you can use molly-foss to remove google notification services
I agree that there are workarounds, but I find it frustrating that Signal devs are ignoring very obvious security and privacy issues like this. It erodes trust and my enthusiasm to use Signal.
Just switched to molly-foss and am using mollysocket and have no issues
Molly was easy enough, switching the notifications was a bit more painful. I found that the airgapped solution worked more seamlessly than the web server though
Signal is in F-Droid and works completely degoogled on Graphene with no Google Play. The annoyance is no notifications, but if you're rolling completely Google Play free, you're probably used to needing to just check several things a day for lack of notifications on multiple apps, since everyone under the sun is trying to shovel all your notification contents to Google (I assume for bribes of some sort from Google).
Not true. I have GrapheneOS with no Google blobs in a profile where I have Signal from play store (via Aurora) and notifications work perfectly. Signal itself will turn on the no google mode for notifications if not available.
This one is stick, not carrot: apps are generally required to use Google's notification system to be allowed in the Play Store.
Signal gets notifications without GMS. I think battery use and latency are a little higher. Molly, a fork can use UnifiedPush for better results.
It is not on Fdroid https://search.f-droid.org/?q=signal&lang=en
It's in the Guardian repo ala torbrowser
Many programs are in 3rd party fdroid repos, you can literally create a fdroid repo for Gmail and Gemini, you just upload apks to the server and run an indexer.
Being included in f-droid.org means the app had to meet some basic standards with regard to privacy. Being included in a 3rd party repo means that someone has uploaded it. And it's a case with the Guardian-distributed Signal, AFAIK it's the original version.
OP meant Signal not making any effort to be included in the f-droid.org repo, not Guardian not making effort to upload the apk from signal.org
Signal has a backdoor - like many other apps. It's private in most situations but not for all... The backdoor is there, and as such, it will never be as secure and private as it could, or should, be...
Can you point it out so we can close it asap?
https://github.com/signalapp
(Iirc it's up to date?)
Thx!
(I'm critical of Signal, but "in this economy" is the best I can hope to switch my friends to.)
https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/issues/8974
I don't understand this & need some explanations (I've heard about the dev, it's just USA stuff, much like Telegram mentioned Russian). Where exactly are the backdoors/the encryption compromised?
Sorry mate. I really don't want to spend time writing exactly what I linked, and then explaining it in another way. English is not my main language, and I don't want to spend a lot of time on it. I will recommend that you read this link a couple of times, and maybe the other link posted also - they explain it very well.
No worries, it's not my main (or second) language either, it's just that no backdoor is explained in that link.
I was just curious.
Oh, you think that they show you the actual door? They don't - ever. But read the article again. Do you think that any agency will post millions into an app, where they don't have a backdoor? The article clearly describes how the privacy part has been weakened.
Isn't it open source?
In open source projects they indeed do show the backdoor. That's is one of the key points of open source (along with free-ish terms of use). Closed source projects just say "there aren't any" without showing anything.
I've said many times I'm critical of Signal & ready to switch, but backdoor seems unconfirmed. Even if probable on some level.
The biggest security issue in Signal is the requirement for phone numbers and SIM cards. This basically forces all Signal users to identify themselves, and makes Signal highly vulnerable to government spying.
Can I get the ETA for fixing this?
Requiring a Sim is not a backdoor and does not enable "spying". I does allow knowing who is on the platform, who talks to who, when, and probably some more metadata issues. But its not a backdoor
It's a huge security vulnerability that Signal devs refuse to fix.
Not more than using username and password. Phone number is a security risk be cause you can get Sim swapped. If you have the registration password it's safe, but a government can request a bypass. However, if you had no phone number and used username and password, governments could still request a bypass
No, phone number is a risk because a phone number uniquely identifies a person. You need a government ID to get a phone number.
Then it's a privacy issue. Not security
Does it really? Iirc, you can determine: when the account was made, and when the last message was sent. This doesn't sound 'highly vulnerable' to me... Doesn't permit inspection of metadata e.g. contacts, so as vulnerabilities go it's pretty weak sauce
A phone number uniquely identifies a person because in most of the world you need a government ID to get a phone number or a SIM card.
Which means that if one account is compromised, then everyone that person talked to is also compromised. You know what they talked with whom. It's an incredible security risk that Signal devs refuse to acknowledge or fix.
If your threat model is deanonymisation of chat users via phone numbers after one chat is fully compromised, then yeah I guess you need to register the accounts with relatively 'untracable' phone numbers (ie unregistered or incorrectly registered burner sims), but that's not my threat model. I'm more concerned about server-side broad-spectrum government surveillance than I am about targeted device seizures. And of course there are mitigations even with data access on device seizure, provided you're unwilling to provide device passwords. But, like, if you're cooperating to the point of providing passwords you're probably sharing what you know about other users identities anyway, so it's a very niche case this applies to.
It's the threat model. E2E encryption is a niche 'nice to have'. Protecting the anonymity of people who have said nasty things about politicians is the most important thing a chat app needs to do. Signal is security theater until they fix this.
No the most important thing a chat app needs to do is send messages between the intended recipients making them unavailable to anyone else. Signal does this. You're worried about ppl receiving messages and knowing who they're from. Generally knowing where a message is from is considered a feature -- if you want anonymous broadcast, pick a different technology that's geared towards that
Afaik you don't need a phone number for Signal (a "username" can substitute it, a few years back they added it).edit: you still do(Also the phone number & IP was the security risk, not the messages, afaik.)
This however was a debate about a supposed backdoor (I otherwise agree about Signal & its USA basedness, I just remain glad it exists despite it
manyfew blemishes).You need a number to register, but not to comunicate
I tried to make a new account for my child recently. You need a number. It wouldn't even work as a first signup on a wifi only tablet.
I tried to uninstall on my phone, set him up a new acct with a VoIP number then move the account to his tablet. It constantly failed when I uninstalled and put my account back on my phone.
You can only use one cellphone. Of you switch between two, it has to deactivate on the other.
Then you can have 4 or 5 other devices but that acct is tied to an activated cell phone and it gets screwy if you change that phone.
Molly (fork of Signal) allows you to use multiple phones https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android
So those posts they implemented this were lies (meaning I obv didn't read attentively enough)?
Sad :(.
They implemented usernames to identify people so we could stop using numbers to find each other.
They still use numbers (cell and possibly device/network ids) they say to identify and secure (or so they say).
The idea is without access to your cell phone, nobody's going to get access to decrypt your data.
Yeah, no, I get & like that, I just somehow specifically (obviously mis-)remember that they did away with phone number as a prerequisite for creating an account (everything still the same, just that the account can't be reset).
:(
try to get a Signal account without a phone number. let me know if it works (hint: it won't work).
What are you referring to? I've read many security breakdowns of signal and nobody who knows what they're talking about has ever mentioned a back door
https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/issues/8974