Just a note to add, this is just the re-confirmation of this year, the two previous years they have had no-logs policy audits as well :)

For those asking about Stealth on Linux, quote from the team:

With Wireguard for Linux about to come out of beta and we are planning to bring Stealth to Linux as well.

Different teams, different products. One thing doesn't exclude the other.

The team is already on it.

Apple officially allows and supports VPN apps since tvOS 17 and there are many VPN apps available for Apple TV now.

Proton does not hold the access key in a form that allows us to decrypt a user's data. Instead, we store a copy of the account’s encryption key, which itself is encrypted using the trusted contact’s public key. This means only the trusted contact can decrypt it — and even they can only do so once Proton's system grants access, for example after a confirmed emergency or timeframe. Neither Proton nor the trusted contact can access the user’s data on their own — both are required for access to happen, preserving end-to-end encryption principles.

The team states the following regarding Firefox:

Support for running language models locally is currently only available in the Firefox Nightly builds. In our testing with Firefox, we haven’t been able to get Proton Scribe to run reliably on a variety of devices. We will see how the situation evolves before adding support.

All password managers keep data unencrypted in memory. You can't encrypt the data in memory because then the application cannot use the data while it is running. It's an universal issue for password managers, and not something that can be fixed.

While you can obfuscate the data, this is really security theater, because it is trivial to reverse engineer the obfuscation. In the future, Proton Pass may also obfuscate, but it doesn't actually add any security.

If you enable PIN lock, the data is encrypted locally and cleared from memory when the PIN lock is activated. The security benefit of this in the case of a compromised device is likely marginal, as malware on a device would be able to key log the pin and bypass it in that manner. However, PIN lock can be desirable on a shared device (although somebody with access to the shared device could also install a keylogger...).

In the previous version of Proton Pass, after the PIN lock, it can take up to 30 minutes to clear data from memory, while the new version clears it immediately. It was previously immediate, but a code regression set it back to up to 30 minutes, but this has now been fixed. In general, for the reasons previously explained, we would not advise people to rely upon the PIN to secure against malware or shared devices, and that's why PIN is not enabled by default, as the security benefit is likely marginal.

By the way, to even take advantage of this, somebody would need to have access to the device and the ability to access the device memory, in which case the PIN is not going to be effective because the device is already compromised. Unfortunately protecting against this type of device compromise is beyond the scope of Proton Pass (or any other password manager).

The most important part is highlighted in bold.

Source:

https://www.reddit.com/r/ProtonPass/comments/16mk5dr/proton_pass_login_data_is_stored_unencrypted_in/k1dxdlc/

From the team:

Our team is currently working on resolving the connection issues experienced by our Linux users, so the app will be temporarily unavailable. We apologize for the inconvenience.

edit:

It should be fixed.

First, let's correct the headline: Proton did not provide information to the FBI. What happened is that the FBI submitted a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) request, which was processed by the Swiss Federal Department of Justice and Police. Proton operates exclusively under Swiss law, and we only respond to legally binding orders from Swiss authorities, after all Swiss legal checks have been passed. This is an important distinction.

Second, let's talk about what this case actually involved. This wasn't a routine investigation. Swiss authorities determined that the legal threshold was met because a law enforcement officer was shot, and explosive devices were found during a protest in 2024. Switzerland has one of the strongest legal frameworks for privacy in the world, and its standard for granting international legal assistance is exceptionally high. This case met that standard.

Third, let's talk about what was actually disclosed. No emails were handed over. No message content. No metadata about who the user communicated with. The only information Proton could provide was a payment identifier because the user chose to pay with a credit card. This is information the user themselves provided to us through their choice of payment method. Proton also accepts cryptocurrency and cash payments, which would not have been linkable to an identity.

If anything, this case demonstrates exactly what we've always said: Proton holds very little user data by design. Even under the most serious legal circumstances, the only data that could be produced was a payment record. Our encryption means we simply cannot access email content even if ordered to.

We understand that stories like this can be alarming, and we take our users' trust seriously. We will continue to fight for privacy and challenge any legal order we believe does not meet the strict requirements of Swiss law. But we also want to be transparent: no service can operate outside the law entirely, and Swiss law requires compliance with valid legal orders in serious criminal cases. What we can promise is that the legal bar in Switzerland is among the highest in the world, and our architecture ensures we have as little data as possible to hand over.

For users who want maximum anonymity: use Proton VPN or Tor, pay with cash or cryptocurrency, and don't add a recovery email.

https://old.reddit.com/r/ProtonMail/comments/1rlt75p/proton_mail_helped_fbi_unmask_anonymous_stop_cop/o8yccme/?context=3

Yes it is. /u/[email protected] is an official account from the Proton team. While the team is currently not posting here at this moment, we both /u/alex_[email protected] and myself are here to answer your questions. We are also moderating the Proton subs on reddit.

Only because of the bridge, which is handling the encryption part. That works on Mac as well as on Linux also.

However an integration to 3rd party clients without such an encryption layer (Bridge) doesn't work.

Github will be available in the upcoming weeks, an APK version might be available sooner.

Source: https://old.reddit.com/r/ProtonMail/comments/1np7knu/new_proton_mail_app_just_released/ng3ikl1/

edit:

Android source code and APK is already on github:

https://github.com/ProtonMail/android-mail

If you're using Aurora, you can select Manual Download with build number 7340.

Teams answer:

Our business audience was the most interested in a writing assistant, this is why we started gradually rolling it out starting with Business and Visionary plans. We will look into making it available to more users at a later date!

Volunteer mod. I am not an employee and not a support agent either. If there are issues, they should be reported to the support team for a proper case handling.

Yes it is. /u/[email protected] is an official account from the Proton team. While the team is currently not posting here at this moment, we both /u/alex_[email protected] and myself are here to answer your questions. We are also moderating the Proton subs on reddit.

edit: We are also figuring out still how everything works here. Please have some patience :-)

I'd assume that is coming later on.. Step by step.

Regarding password managers:

All password managers keep data unencrypted in memory. You can't encrypt the data in memory because then the application cannot use the data while it is running. It's an universal issue for password managers, and not something that can be fixed.

While you can obfuscate the data, this is really security theater, because it is trivial to reverse engineer the obfuscation. In the future, Proton Pass may also obfuscate, but it doesn't actually add any security.

If you enable PIN lock, the data is encrypted locally and cleared from memory when the PIN lock is activated. The security benefit of this in the case of a compromised device is likely marginal, as malware on a device would be able to key log the pin and bypass it in that manner. However, PIN lock can be desirable on a shared device (although somebody with access to the shared device could also install a keylogger...).

In the previous version of Proton Pass, after the PIN lock, it can take up to 30 minutes to clear data from memory, while the new version clears it immediately. It was previously immediate, but a code regression set it back to up to 30 minutes, but this has now been fixed. In general, for the reasons previously explained, we would not advise people to rely upon the PIN to secure against malware or shared devices, and that's why PIN is not enabled by default, as the security benefit is likely marginal.

By the way, to even take advantage of this, somebody would need to have access to the device and the ability to access the device memory, in which case the PIN is not going to be effective because the device is already compromised. Unfortunately protecting against this type of device compromise is beyond the scope of Proton Pass (or any other password manager).

https://www.reddit.com/r/ProtonPass/comments/16mk5dr/proton_pass_login_data_is_stored_unencrypted_in/k1dxdlc/

We'll be working on a new CLI based on the new v4 app, but we're currently working on WireGuard, so it might take some time until we get the CLI out.

This is the status from the team.