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A team of researchers from Stanford University, La Trobe University and Australian National University conducted a series of simulations to test the vulnerability of Australia’s economic and strategic lifelines.

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The simulations tested the abilities of the Australian, US and Indian militaries to respond to two possible crisis scenarios involving China.

[The research] demonstrated that maritime trading routes required protection across the full length of the Indian Ocean, not just in waters close to Australia.

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Under certain conditions ... a single successful attack on shipping in the central Indian Ocean could severely disrupt trade across the entire region. It could trigger prohibitive war-risk premiums from shipping insurers, costly route diversions, or the withdrawal of commercial traffic from the Indian Ocean altogether.

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Australia has the world’s largest Indian Ocean coastline. Despite this geographic reality, Canberra’s focus rarely extends beyond the part of the ocean closest to Australian territory.

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Both the 2024 National Defence Strategy and the 2026 National Defence Strategy identify this part of the northeast Indian Ocean as Australia’s primary area of military interest, alongside maritime Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

In some ways, this makes sense ... But China’s underwater capabilities – both manned and unmanned – pose a growing challenge to Australia’s security interests across the entire Indian Ocean.

In peacetime, China’s submarine presence in the ocean is constrained by the vast distances from its mainland bases. However, access to ports in partner countries such as Djibouti or Pakistan could potentially allow Chinese submarines to spend longer periods of time in the region.

Even a relatively small number of Chinese submarines in the Indian Ocean could force Australia and its partners to devote substantial resources to anti-submarine warfare and maritime surveillance.

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Other actors could further boost China’s capacity to disrupt Australian interests in the ocean. These include Iran and the Houthi rebels in Yemen, who are now blockading Saudi ports in the Red Sea.

These actors would not need to coordinate closely with China. Nor would they even need to pursue identical objectives. Simply creating disruptions at key points across the Indian Ocean could make it harder for Australia and its partner navies to maintain sea control and protect commercial shipping.

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Australia’s defence strategy in the Indian Ocean relies on its partnerships ... For Beijing, this cooperation is concerning because it could eventually outweigh China’s own capabilities.

Protecting sea lanes and tracking underwater threats in the ocean will require Australia’s partner countries to seamlessly share data and intelligence during a crisis. And building these lines of communication now will be far easier than doing it when problems emerge.

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In a related report, the Austrian Strategic Policy Institute reports that Japan’s economic security minister is visiting. Australia needs one, too,

The visit to Australia this week by Kimi Onoda, Japan’s minister responsible for science, technology and economic security, is a reminder that the strength of the Australia–Japan relationship depends on the depth of its economic foundations. It is also a reminder that Australia currently lacks a position equivalent to Onoda’s role in Japan’s cabinet – a minister with a remit to coordinate economic security across the departments responsible for industrial policy and national security.

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